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The Williams Act After RICO: Has the
Balance Tipped In Favor Of
Incumbent Management?
By WILLIAM C. TYSON*
and ANDREW A. AUGUST**
In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act' primarily to regulate
two favored methods of corporate takeovers-substantial stock acquisi-
tions and tender offers.2 The Act regulates these transactions through
its comprehensive reporting requirements and broad fraud prohibi-
tions. Although the statute permits the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to institute enforcement suits,3 it does not explicitly grant
standing to maintain a private right of action to those injured by a vio-
* Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., 1967,
Princeton University; J.D., 1970, Harvard University.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Stuart R. Pollak, California Superior Court. B.A.,
1980, University of Colorado; J.D., 1983, University of San Francisco.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). The Act added §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d),
14(e), and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [here-
inafter cited as the Securities Exchange Act].
2. Although the term "tender offer" is critical to the scheme of the Williams Act,
neither the Act nor the regulations promulgated thereunder define it. There are, however,
two generally recognized types of tender offers: conventional and unconventional. A con-
ventional tender offer "normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of
a company-usually at a price above current market price." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1967). Such an offer would be communicated directly to all of the existing hold-
ers of the securities to be purchased. An unconventional tender offer has been described as a
solicitation of only a limited number of a company's shareholders. See M. LiPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 113-23 (1978). Purchases of a corporation's
stock in the open market would not normally constitute a tender offer, but to the extent that
they precede a conventional or unconventional tender offer, they may be characterized by
some as a "creeping" tender offer. See, e.g., Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 9-11,
Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 198,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981). For a complete discussion of the meaning of
tender offer, see generally Note, The Elusive Deinition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. L. 503
(1982); Note, Cash Tender Offers: 4 Proposed De6nintion, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 694 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Cash Tender Offers]; Note, What Is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 908 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tender Offer?].
3. At the time the Williams Act was passed, § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
authorized such enforcement suits. The incorporation of the Williams Act into the Securi-
ties Exchange Act made § 21(d) applicable to Williams Act violations.
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lation of its provisions.4 As a result, the federal courts have been called
upon to decide whether a private remedy is implied.5
When litigation under the Williams Act began, virtually all federal
courts favored the full implication of liability. 6 In the mid-1970s, how-
ever, the Supreme Court signalled its dissatisfaction with implied rights
of action.7 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries," the Court denied an un-
successful tender offeror standing to sue for damages under the Wil-
liams Act. This decision raised serious doubts about the standing of a
corporation that is targeted for takeover to sue for either damages or
equitable relief. Heeding the Supreme Court's signal, a number of
lower federal courts retreated from their earlier position, 9 leaving target
management uncertain about the efficacy of initiating litigation under
the Williams Act to thwart a hostile, and allegedly unlawful, takeover
attempt.
By the early 1980s, attorneys representing target corporations had
discovered a potent supplement to the Williams Act-the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).10 RICO, enacted
in 1970," had remained virtually unnoticed in the field of securities
law until this time. Congress' stated purpose in adopting RICO was to
eradicate organized crime from the American economy. Corporate at-
4. In certain areas of substantive law, such as federal securities law, the issue of stand-
ing to sue and the implication of a private cause of action under a statute frequently overlap
and therefore are considered interchangeably by the courts and commentators. Standing in
this sense should not be confused, however, with the constitutional doctrine. See 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 181 &
n.20 (1975).
5. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), a federal
district court had ruled that a private cause of action for damages should be implied under
Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. The question was finally settled by the
Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971),
in which the Court held that a private right of action was available. In J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Supreme Court had implied a private right of action under
§ 14(a) of the Securities-Exchange Act and rule 14a-9.
6. See infra notes 65-71 & accompanying text. But see infra notes 31, 96 & accompa-
nying text.
7. The Supreme Court's decisions in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975), and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), were the the first signs that the Court
was dissatisified with the expansive notions of standing then developing in the federal
courts. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws.-
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the Williams Act
After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 120-21 (1978).
8. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
9. See infra notes 92-99 & accompanying text.
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
11. RICO was enacted as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-47 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 & 28 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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torneys, however, have tailored RICO to their needs by interpreting its
provisions to give target companies an express right to sue for certain
violations of the Williams Act.' 2
RICO outlaws the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise
through "a pattern of racketeering activity,"' 13 and attorneys for target
corporations have argued that whenever a raider corporation intention-
ally commits two acts in violation of the Williams Act that facilitate the
acquisition of a target corporation's stock and that injure the target, a
RICO claim exists.' 4 Such a claim would entitle the target to RICO's
express civil remedies: equitable relief or three times the damage to its
business or property, plus costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.15 Al-
though a violation of the Williams Act would not ordinarily be viewed
as a racketeering activity, RICO specifically defines racketeering activ-
ity to include "any offense involving. . . fraud in the sale of securities
. . . punishable under any law of the United States."'16
Since there are only two reported court decisions that address the
use of this litigation strategy, and since both decisions arose on motions
to dismiss,17 substantive legal questions and problems relating to the
application and continued viability of the strategy have not been ad-
dressed. The purpose of this Article is to explore one such problem: the
policy conflict that emerges from the use of Williams Act violations
when stating a cause of action under RICO. We suggest a solution to
this conflict that, if implemented, will affect future contests for corpo-
rate control.
At the outset, let us state the four basic elements of the problem.
First, the Williams Act and RICO can embrace the same subject mat-
12. For a chatty discussion of this new interpretation, see A New Ploy to Fight Take-
overs, Bus. WK., May 24, 1982, at 91.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1976).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 231, 252-53.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
17. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Spencer Companies v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass.
Nov. 17, 1981).
There are four other cases in which Williams Act violations were alleged in conjunction
with a RICO claim, but in each of these cases either the target corporation did not use-or
the court did not address-Williams Act violations as the RICO predicate offense. In each
case the RICO count was unsuccessful. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 289-91
(4th Cir. 1983); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301,303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd,
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,502 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1983); Marshall Field
& Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,834, at 94,291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982).
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ter. Second, both statutes reflect the distinct formulation of certain
congressional goals. Third, because the two statutes were not enacted
in contemplation of each other, these goals may be in conflict. Fourth,
when these two statutes come to bear on each other in the same fact
situation-such as the RICO litigation we have described-a conflict
surfaces. To resolve this conflict, the courts should construe the two
statutes so that Congress' objectives in passing each one will not be
frustrated. When such a harmonization is not possible, the courts must
determine which statute should control.
In our consideration of how the Williams Act and RICO should be
interpreted when juxtaposed in the same litigation, the starting point is
the legislative intent of each statute. Part I and Part II of this Article
are devoted, respectively, to an interpretation of the Williams Act and
RICO. We examine the pertinent statutory provisions, the legislative
history, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this legislative his-
tory. In Part I we argue that the Williams Act has two purposes: 1) the
protection of investors involved in corporate takeover attempts through
full and fair disclosure; and 2) the maintenance of statutory and regula-
tory neutrality in such takeover attempts to avoid tipping the balance
in favor of either target management or the insurgent groups. We fur-
ther argue that Congress established this balance to preserve, for the
benefit of investors, the viability of takeover attempts. In Part II we
argue, based in part on the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of
the RICO statute, that RICO's purpose must be construed broadly. In
this regard we develop two separate ideas: 1) even though Congress
enacted RICO to create new legal tools to help eradicate organized
crime from legitimate businesses, Congress realized that to be effective
and constitutionally sound RICO had to extend beyond organized
crime and reach the white collar businessperson as well; and 2) there is
no indication that Congress intended the RICO provisions to be con-
strued other than literally, and hence they should apply to violations of
the federal securities laws, including the Williams Act.
In Part III we examine the two reported cases in which a court has
passed upon a target corporation's use of alleged violations of the Wil-
liams Act to state a claim under RICO. In Part IV we argue that the
judicial approval of such RICO suits places the goals of the two statutes
in irreconcilable conflict; by providing a powerful weapon to only one
side of the corporate takeover battle, incumbent management, RICO
1#7s the balance that Congress attempted to establish in passing the Wil-
liams Act. We conclude in Part V, based on settled doctrines of statu-
tory construction, that 1) because of this irreconcilable conflict, the two
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statutes cannot be harmonized when involved in the same litigation,
and 2) since the Williams Act is the more precise and detailed of the
two statutes, it should apply to the exclusion of RICO. The effect of
our conclusion would be to preclude this type of RICO litigation in the
future; when the Williams Act and RICO are juxtaposed in litigation,
the courts would construe RICO's predicate offense of "fraud in the
sale of securities" to exclude any violations of the Williams Act that
occur during the litigated takeover attempt. If so interpreted, the Wil-
hams Act's congressionally mandated goal of neutrality in corporate
takeover attempts would not be frustrated, and RICO's goals would be
eviscerated only in small measure.
The Williams Act
The Statutory Provisions
The vital provisions of the Williams Act are sections 13(d), 18
14(d), 19 and 14(e)20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.21 Sections
13(d) and 14(d) are reporting and disclosure provisions. Section 14(e)
is an antifraud provision. Both section 13(d) and section 14(d) provide
that, in certain stock purchase situations, an acquirer or offeror must
file disclosure statements with the Securities and Exhange Commis-
sion.22 Under rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, these statements are made on Schedules 13D and 14D,
respectively.23 The information required in these disclosures includes:
the background and identity of the acquirer or offeror, the source and
amount of funds or other consideration to be used in making the
purchases, the extent of the holdings of the acquirer or offeror in the
target corporation, and the purpose of the purchases. 24 Copies of these
statements must also be sent to the target and each national securities
exchange where the securities are traded.25 In this way, the informa-
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
19. Id § 78n(d).
20. Id § 78n(e).
21. The Williams Act also added §§ 13(e) and 14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act.
Section 13(e) regulates the issuer's purchases of its own securities. Section 14(f) provides
that if a majority of a target corporation's directors is to be replaced in connection with an
acquisition or tender offer, shareholders must be provided with certain information. Id.§§ 78m(e), 78n(D.
22. Id. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d).
23. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101, 240.14d-101 (1983).
24. For a more complete list, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
25. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 240.14d-3 (1983). In the case of a § 14(d) disclosure, copies
must also be sent to any competing bidders. Id. § 240.14d-3.
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tion disclosed is theoretically made available to shareholders and
investors.
Although similar, sections 13(d) and 14(d) differ in two important
respects. First, section 13(d) requires disclosure within ten days after
any acquisition that makes the purchaser more than a five percent ben-
eficial owner of any class of equity security of a target corporation. 26
Section 14(d), on the other hand, applies to acquisitions made pursuant
to a tender offer.27 When the consummation of a tender offer will make
the offeror more than a five percent beneficial owner of any class of
equity security of a corporation, section 14(d) requires that disclosure
statements be filed before the tender offer is made.28 The second differ-
ence is that section 13(d) imposes no restraints on the acquirer and
seller in negotiating the terms of the transaction, whereas section 14(d)
automatically structures the terms of the tender offer by providing cer-
tain benefits for target shareholders who elect to tender their shares.29
Implicit in both section 13(d) and section 14(d) is the obligation to file
statements that are neither false nor misleading with respect to any ma-
terial fact.30
Section 14(e)31 is a curious hybrid of Securities and Exchange
Commission rules lOb-5 32 and 14a-933 that prohibits the same activities
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
27. Id § 78n(d).
28. Id. The disclosure statements are also required if, at the time the offer is made, the
offeror already owns five percent of the securities sought. Id.
29. Tendering shareholders are guaranteed the right to withdraw securities for a speci-
fied period after they have been deposited. Id. § 78n(d)(5). The Securities and Exchange
Commission has promulgated a slightly different time period pursuant to its statutory au-
thority under § 14(d)(5). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(2) (1983). If the tender offer is for
less than all outstanding shares and more than the requested number of shares is tendered
during the first 10 days of the offer, the offeror must take these tendered securities pro rata.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). Finally, shareholders who tender before a price increase in the
terms of the tender offer must be given the advantages of the additional consideration. Id.
§ 78n(d)(7). See Note, Tender Offer?, supra note 2, at 909.
30. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), ceri. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972) ("the obligation to file ruthful statements [under § 13(d)] is implicit in the
obligation to file with the issuer") (emphasis in original).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solici-
tation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule lOb-5 outlaws untrue or misleading statements
and fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
33. Id § 240.14a-9. Rule 14a-9 forbids the use of false or misleading statements in
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forbidden by these rules: fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative con-
duct, and false or misleading statements.34 Section 14(e)'s prohibition,
however, applies to acts by any person in connection with a tender offer
or to acts in connection with any solicitation in opposition to the
tender, as by a rival bidder or by target management resisting displace-
ment. 35 Thus, section 14(e), like section 14(d) but unlike section 13(d),
deals with the tender offer situation and not with open market
purchases.36 Further, the statement required by section 14(d), if not
truthful, might be deemed to constitute a violation of section 14(e). 37
connection with a proxy contest. The provisions of the Williams Act, including § 14(e), were
patterned on the existing proxy regulations of which rule 14a-9 is the antifraud provision.
113 CONG. REC. 24,664-65 (1967).
34. Section 14(e), in effect, applies Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 to
the tender offer context. Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145,
1153 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1969)). Section 14(e) is applicable "in connection with any
tender offer" whereas rule lob-5 is applicable "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."
35. The purchaser-seller standing requirement imposed by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), does not apply to claims brought under § 14(e). Under
§ 14(e), "a plaintiff may gain standing if he has been injured by fraudulent activities of
others perpetrated in connection with a tender offer, whether or not he has tendered his
shares." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974) (citation omitted).
36. Section 14(e), however, unlike § 14(d), governs all tender offers. The disclosure
provisions of § 14(d) apply only to tender offers for a class of an equity security that is either
registered under § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act or listed on a national securities
exchange. Section 14(d) requires disclosure only if the offeror will be more than a five per-
cent beneficial owner of such security after the consummation of the tender offer. Id.
§ 78n(d). In contrast, § 14(e) applies to any tender offer (or requests or invitations for ten-
ders) without regard to whether the class of securities being sought is subject to § 14(d) and
without regard to the percentage ownership of the offeror. Id. § 78n(e). In this regard,
§ 13(d) is more akin to § 14(d) in that it only regulates transactions in securities that are
either registered under § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act or listed on a national securi-
ties exchange. Id. § 78m(d).
37. A violation of § 13(d) may also constitute a violation of § 14(e) if the open market
purchases triggering § 13(d) are viewed as part of a "creeping" tender offer. See supra note
2.
When standing is granted to a plaintiff to sue for violations of § 14(e), the plaintiff
generally has had to establish all the elements of the common law tort of deceit, namely, that
the defendant made, in connection with a tender offer: 1) a misstatement or omission; 2) of a
material fact; 3) with an intent to defraud the plaintiff; 4) who subsequently relied on the
misrepresentation or omission; and 5) suffered damages as a result of that reliance. Note,
Securities Law: Implied Causes ofAction Under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 66 MINN.
L. REv. 865, 868-69 (1982). This Note, however, concluded that in view of the Supreme
Court's decision in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (establishing nonuniform culpability
requirements for the three subparagraphs of § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Securities Act]), a plaintiff alleging a violation
of the first prong of§ 14(e) (making it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state any material fact") should not have to prove scienter, but a plaintiff
September 1983]
Legislative History: Purposes and Policies of the Williams Act
The interpretation of a federal statute entails not only an examina-
tion of the provisions of the statute but also an identification of the
purposes and congressional policies underlying the statute.38 Discern-
ing the congressional intent behind the Williams Act thus requires an
examination of representative statements contained in committee re-
ports or made during legislative consideration of the bill.
By the mid-1960s, the cash tender offer method of corporate take-
over had become favored over its traditional alternative, the proxy
campaign. 39 This increased popularity was largely attributable to the
dearth of meaningful federal or state controls on the tender offer pro-
cess compared to the effective and comprehensive federal regulation of
the proxy contest.40 Persuaded that this "gap" 41 in the federal securi-
ties laws should be filled, Senator Harrison Williams introduced Senate
alleging a violation of the second prong of § 14(e) (making it unlawful "to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices") should have to prove scienter. The
Note's conclusion is broadly stated and would appear to apply to suits for damages and
equitable relief. Note, supra, at 869 n.20. Further, a plaintiff alleging a violation of the
second prong of § 14(e) may not have to establish a misrepresentation. See infra note 135.
On the other hand, §§ 13(d) and 14(d) are reporting-disclosure provisions: although a plain-
tiff, in order to establish a violation, would have to show that a false or misleading statement
with respect to a material fact was made on a Schedule 13D or Schedule 14D, it should not
be necessary to show scienter. SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The issue of scienter under §§ 13(d) and 14(d), at least in damage actions, may be moot since
there is a growing trend among courts to permit such actions only under § 18(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act.
38. Congress often attempts to clarify its intent by attaching a preamble or statement of
purpose to enacted legislation. See infra text accompanying note 148. The Williams Act
contains no such preamble or statement of purpose.
39. See Pitt, supra note 7, at 126-27. Only eight cash tender offers were made before
1960. The aggregate amount of those offers totaled less than two hundred million dollars.
In 1966, however, there were over one hundred tender offers which, in the aggregate, totaled
almost one billion dollars. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812. See also Note, supra note 37, at 866 n.6; Note,
Tender Offers Standing to Sue, Prohibited Practices, Reliance of Non-Tenderer, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 930, 930 n.3 (1980).
40. See Pitt, supra note 7, at 125-27. The chief advantage afforded tender offerors, in
the absence of regulation, was the opportunity to operate in almost complete secrecy. There
was no obligation that the offeror disclose its identity, the source of its funds, its associates,
or its future plans if control were obtained. Nor was the offeror under any obligation to give
the shareholders any specified time in which to consider the offer. Practically speaking,
investors were placed in the position of having to make hasty, uninformed decisions as to
whether they should tender their shares. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 39, at 3, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws. at 2812-13. See also infra text accompanying notes
53-54.
41. The "gap" was thought to exist because the use of the cash tender offer effectively
"removed a substantial number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing dis-
closure requirements of the federal securities laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
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Bill 2731 in 1965 to regulate tender offers and large accumulations of a
corporation's shares.42 This bill would have required that "any cash
tender offers and, indeed, any substantial accumulation of shares...
be preceded by the filing of public information. '43 Senator Williams
saw such disclosure as "the only way that corporations, their stockhold-
ers, and employees [could] be adequately prepared in advance to meet
the threat of the takeover specialist."'44
Senate Bill 2731 had a somewhat limited objective and was aptly
characterized as the "Incumbent Management Protection Act. ' 45 The
bill was not enacted46 but was revised and reintroduced by Senator
Williams in 1967 as Senate Bill 510.4 7 The new version of the bill re-
flected a shift in attitude. In the two-year period between the introduc-
tion of Senator Williams' two bills, some academics, practitioners, and
legislators had become concerned that requiring disclosure of cash
tender offers and open market acquisitions would give incumbent man-
agement an advantage in corporate takeover attempts.48 This result
was viewed as undesirable because in some cases the best interests of
society would be served by providing a method for ousting uninventive
and inefficient entrenched management.49 In response to this concern,
the final version of Senate Bill 510 was drafted to avoid giving incum-
bent management a marked advantage in the battle for corporate con-
trol. This was accomplished by imposing restrictions on the conduct of
incumbent management and others who opposed tender offers, and by
22 (1977). See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 39, at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2813.
42. 111 CONG. REc. 28,257-60 (1965).
43. Id. at 28,259.
44. Id. That Senator Williams envisioned the threat as an ominous one is evidenced by
his remarks when introducing the bill: "In recent years we have seen proud old companies
reduced to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from
sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to
split up most of the loot among themselves. . . ." Id at 28,257.
45. See Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws,
43 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 551, 553 (1975).
46. Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regula-
tion, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 499, 508 (1967).
47. S. 510, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 24,662-64 (1967). The bill was co-
sponsored by Senator Thomas Kuchel and had the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and virtually all major stock exchanges. Id. at 24,665.
48. See Note, The Scope of Section 14(d): What Is a Tender Offer?, 34 OHiO ST. L.J.
375, 376-77 (1973).
49. See Moylan, supra note 45, at 557. Senator Williams himself acknowledged the
merits of tender offers when he emphasized that the "measure is not aimed at obstructing
legitimate takeover bids. In some instances, a change in management will prove a welcome
boon for shareholders. . . and in a few severe situations it may be necessary if the company
is to survive." 113 CONG. Rc. 854 (1967).
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reducing the constraints on the conduct of tender offerors.50 In this
final form, Senate Bill 510, known as the Williams Act, was passed by
Congress. 51
Senator Williams neatly summarized the twin purposes of his bill:
"to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while
at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportu-
nity to fairly present their case." z52 The bill's first objective, investor
protection, was underscored by congressional concern with abuses in
the takeover process. Congress was solicitous about the secrecy sur-
rounding substantial stock acquisitions and tender offers. 53 There was
also concern about the "undue pressure on shareholders to act hastily
and to accept [an offer] before management or any other group [had]
an opportunity to present opposing arguments or competing offers." 54
Finally, there was a keen awareness of the misleading statements and
50. The final version of S. 510 contained several provisions intended to neutralize the
tender offer legislation previously introduced by Senator Williams. First, whereas the an-
tifraud provision in the original version of the bill applied only to the offeror, the antifraud
provision in § 14(e) of the final version of the bill was expressly made applicable to the
opponents of a tender offer as well. Second, the final version of § 14(d)(4) granted the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission additional rule-making power to regulate target man-
agement countersolicitations. Third, a prior-notice requirement was dropped and the
concurrent disclosure mandate of § 14(d)(1) was adopted. Finally, the bill imposed a regu-
latory scheme, now contained in § 13(e), on a corporation's repurchase of its own shares.
112 CONG. REC. 19,003-07 (1966). See also Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv.
377, 381 n.28 (1969); Note, Private Litigation Under the Williams Act.- Standing to Sue, Ele-
ments of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545, 548 n.31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Standing]; Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 701 n.56.
51. Williams.Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
52. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967). In the tender offer context, the advance disclosures
required by § 14(d) were viewed as necessary in order to permit shareholders to make in-
formed decisions whether to sell or retain their shares. The post-acquisition disclosures by
§ 13(d) were, on the other hand, deemed necessary so that shareholders and the investment
community would have notice of potential shift in control of the corporation, thereby al-
lowing the market to reflect accurate valuations of the corporation's worth. See Note, Pri-
vate Rights ofAction for Damages Under Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581, 582 (1980).
53. See supra note 40. Senator Kuchel, a co-sponsor of the bill, lamented the "tragedy"
of the "rape" of corporations by raiders acting under a "cloak of secrecy." Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
54. Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 21, 35. Offers at a premium over the market rate
were often made under conditions suggesting that a "hasty deposit" was necessary because
the transaction would be conducted on a "first come, first serve basis." Those who tendered
their shares at an early stage of the offer were deprived of the opportunity to take advantage
of subsequent and more attractive offers, either from the same or different source. Id. at 17.
These tactics were also used by incumbent management to pressure its shareholders into
"refusing a tender offer on the basis of unsubstantiated or irrelevant arguments." Id. at 204-
05. See also Pitt, supra note 7, at 127-28.
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deceptive or manipulative practices used by the various participants in
the corporate takeover battle. 55
Coequa 56 with Congress' goal of investor protection is the bill's
second objective-providing an evenhanded process for all participants
in the takeover battle. The evolution of the Williams Act manifests a
congressional attempt to create a comprehensive and pervasive legisla-
tive scheme that would scrupulously preserve, through statutory and
regulatory neutrality, the viability of the takeover techniques under
consideration.5 7 While neutrality was perceived by Congress as a prin-
cipal means of providing investor protection, it was also viewed as a
distinct goal that Congress was apparently unwilling to subordinate,
particularly after it had so painstakingly avoided "tipping the balance"
in favor of either the target or offeror.58
The legislative documents provide no guidance, however, as to
whether this principle of neutrality should apply when a violation of
the Act occurs or is alleged. Did neutrality signify that neither party to
the takeover contest could initiate litigation to remedy the violation?
Was rectification to be provided only through an enforcement action by
the Securities and Exchange Commission? Or did it mean that both
sides were entitled to bring civil actions?59 The task of interpreting the
55. Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 60, 62, 196, 236.
56. The House and Senate Reports appear to indicate that the two purposes are of
equal importance, although this point is arguable. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 39,
at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2813; S. REP. No. 550, supra note 2,
at 3; see also Note, Standing, supra note 50, at 548-59. Some commentators argue that inves-
tor protection is the predominant purpose. See Note, Cash Tender Offers, supra note 2, at
700; Note, Tender Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REr. 51, 54 (1976).
57. See supra notes 42-51 & accompanying text.
58. The interest-balancing approach of the bill was repeatedly emphasized. As Senator
Williams stated upon introducing the bill:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to
protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders
without unduly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid
tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the
offeror.
113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967). Moreover, the Senator's approach was adopted by the re-
ports of the Senate and House committees that considered the bill. See supra note 56.
59. In part, this is simply another way of asking whether Congress intended to imply
private actions for violations of the Act, and if so, in favor of whom. Although some com-
mentators contend that Congress did consider the question of implication of liability under
the Williams Act, see, e.g., Pitt, supra note 7, at 142, the Supreme Court has concluded
otherwise, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31-33 (1977). Similarly, the legislative
histories of both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act apparently do not refer
to implied rights of action. See Pitt, supra note 7, at 129 n.85.
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import of neutrality in the context of private litigation ultimately de-
volved upon the federal courts.
Judicial Construction of the Purposes and Policies of the Williams Act
The Supreme Court has considered the legislative history of the
Williams Act in three decisions: Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. ,60
which involved the standards for injunctive relief for violations of the
Act; Poer v. Chris-Craft Industries,61 which considered a tender of-
feror's standing to sue for damages under the Act; and Edgar v. MITE
Corp. ,62 which dealt with the constitutionality of a state statute regulat-
ing tender offers. Before reviewing these decisions, two caveats are in
order. First, the substantive issues raised in these cases are, for the
most part, ancillary to our objective of ascertaining the Supreme
Court's construction of the legislative intent of the Williams Act. A
brief discussion of the issues is included, however, to demonstrate why
the Supreme Court construed the Act as it did in Rondeau and Chris-
Craft, and to show what a plurality of the Supreme Court viewed as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of the Act in
MITE. Second, we discuss lower federal court decisions on the issue
of standing to sue under the Act for two limited purposes: to evaluate
the Chris-Craft Court's interpretation of the congressional intent of the
Act, and to summarize the disagreement among the lower federal
courts in the aftermath of Chris-Craft about the target corporation's
standing to sue.
The Cases Before Chris-Craft
Before the Supreme Court's consideration of the Williams Act's
provisions and purposes, lower federal courts consistently recognized
Congress' concern with protecting investors and ensuring evenhanded
regulation of contests for corporate control.63 The relative emphasis to
be placed on these two goals was never examined. In the courts' view
both goals could be accomodated simultaneously by granting standing
to sue to virtually every participant in the takeover process.64 Thus,
tendering and non-tendering shareholder-offerees, offerors, and targets
were all deemed to have standing to sue for both equitable relief and
compensatory damages for violations of the Williams Act.65
60. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
61. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
62. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
63. See generally Pitt, supra note 7, at 130-33.
64. Id
65. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975) (standing of tendering
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With respect to suits by target companies, standing was seen as
consonant with investor protection. Damages would benefit the share-
holder-investor and would serve to deter violations,66 and equitable re-
lief would, for example, remedy misleading disclosures so that
investors could make informed investment decisions.67 Suits by tender
offerors were likewise seen as furthering the protection of investors;
implied rights of action for damages would provide effective enforce-
ment and deterrent mechanisms, while implied rights of action for eq-
uitable relief would serve to rectify violations of the Act.68 The logic
behind this neutrality was stated compellingly by the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit:
[Implying for the offeror and the target's management reciprocal
rights of action for damages seems only fair given that each has a
heavy economic stake, and that each is subject to what has been aptly
described as "symmetrical" statutory obligations. Each is victimized
when the other commits illegal acts to defeat or accomplish takeover
bids.69
Several lower courts, while granting standing to assert violations
of the Act, nevertheless recognized that litigation under the Act, if not
properly monitored, could be used to thwart or discourage lawful
tender offers and substantial stock purchases. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, for example, noted that "Congress intended to
assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic re-
quirement of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a
shareholder to sue for damages); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) (standing of non-tendering shareholder to sue both
individually and derivatively for damages); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d
421 (1st Cir. 1973) (standing of target company and offeror to sue for injunctive relief and
damages); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969) (standing of target company to sue for injunctive relief); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes,
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (standing of non-tendering shareholder to sue for
injunctive relief and damages); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stand-
ing of tendering shareholder to sue for injunctive relief). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN
& G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 104, 175
n.14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as E. ARANOW]; Pitt, supra note 7, at 131-32.
66. See H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 423 (Ist Cir. 1973).
67. E. ARANow, supra note 65, at 112. It was perceived that the target of a takeover
attempt is best suited to monitor the process. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720-
21 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969).
68. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 423-24 (1st Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 424 (citation omitted). The Porter case was a suit brought by a thwarted
tender offeror for damages under § 14(e). In factual situations that are governed solely by
§ 13(d) because the acquisition is not followed by a tender offer, the acquirer is the only
party who has statutory obligations. When a § 13(d) acquisition precedes a tender offer,
however, both sides of the takeover ultimately would have "symmetrical" statutory obliga-
tions. See infra note 292 & accompanying text.
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potent tool for incumbent management to protect its own interests
against the desires and welfare of the stockholders." 70 Similarly, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated, with reference to the re-
quired filings under section 13(d), that "[tiarget companies must not be
provided the opportunity to use the future plans provision as a tool for
dilatory litigation. '71
The Supreme Court considered the Williams Act for the first time
in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.72 Rondeau was an action by an
issuer against an acquirer who failed to file timely reports as required
by section 13(d). The issuer sought damages and a permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting the acquisition of additional shares.73 The narrow is-
sue before the Court was whether the issuer should have to
demonstrate irreparable harm to secure the requested injunctive re-
lief.74 The Court held that irreparable harm must be demonstrated,
and found that since only a technical, unintended violation of the Act
had occurred, relief should not be granted.75
While the Rondeau Court recognized the importance of investor
protection, it noted that "Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or pre-
vent large accumulations of stock which would create the potential for
such attempts. ' 76 By conditioning injunctive relief on a showing of ir-
reparable harm, the Court apparently sought to preserve, in accordance
with legislative policy, the viability of the tender offer technique. The
Court gave no indication, however, that the concept of neutrality did
not still afford both sides of the contest standing to sue to redress viola-
tions of the Act.
The Chris-Craft Decision
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Pioer v. Chris-Craft In-
70. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir.
1969). The court cautioned district court judges not to allow management to "resort to the
courts on trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and thereby defeating legit-
imate tender offers." Id. at 947.
71. Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir.
1970) (citation omitted).
72. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
73. Id. at 54-55.
74. Id. at 57. The target's standing to sue for equitable relief under the Act was not
questioned by the petitioner-acquirer and was not addressed by the Court.
75. Id. at 58-59, 65.
76. Id. at 58. The Court noted that since the petitioner had complied with the Act's
disclosure requirements, albeit tardily, there was no likelihood that the respondent's share-
holders would be disadvantaged. Id. at 59.
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dustries77 jarred all prior judicial interpretations of the Williams Act
and its legislative history. In Chris-Craft, the Court summarily dis-
missed the concept of neutrality as a purpose of the Act and as a basis
for an unsuccessful tender offeror's standing to sue a competing offeror
and target management under section 14(e) of the Act.78 The Court's
denial of standing was predicated on the proposition that a private
right of action for damages in favor of a tender offeror would be im-
plied only if the action was necessary to effect Congress' goals.79 The
Court decided that the sole purpose of section 14(e) was to protect in-
vestors confronted with a tender offer.8 0 Since the tender offeror was
not an intended beneficiary of the Act, the Court held that it was not
necessary to award the tender offeror damages in order to achieve con-
gressional aims.8' In response to the argument that the Act's purpose
of neutrality supported the inclusion of tender offerors in the class pro-
tected by the Act, the Court stated:
Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in con-
tests for control, but its policy of evenhandedness does not go either
to the purpose of the legislation or to whether a private cause of ac-
tion is implicit in the statute. Neutrality is, rather, but one character-
istic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the
protection of investors. . . . This express policy of neutrality
scarcely suggests an intent to confer highly important, new rights
upon the class of participants whose activities prompted the legisla-
77. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
78. Id at 29-30. See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (indicating that Chris-Craft had "shattered the nearly universal holdings of
lower courts"). In another vein, before Chris-Craft the courts had realized that the Williams
Act could, but should not, be used as a weapon in takeover attempts when no, or only
technical, violations of the Act had occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
The Chris-Craft Court thus jarred prior judicial interpretations of the Act in another impor-
tant way by viewing as a weapon a suit that asserted what appeared to be a patent violation
of the Act. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 38.
79. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 24-26.
80. Id. at 35.
81. Id. at 37. The Court noted that its conclusion that the legislative history evinced an
intent to protect only investors was confirmed by its earlier analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975). In Cort v. Ash, four factors were identified as relevant in determining whether a
private right of action should be implied in a statute not expressly providing one:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted". . .? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plain-
tiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in
an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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tion in the first instance.82
This narrow holding, however, left unresolved many issues of standing,
including whether shareholder-offerees and target corporations have an
implied cause of action under section 14(e). 3
Before its decision in Chris-Craft, the Supreme Court had never
refused a request to imply a right of action under the federal securities
laws.8 4 The Court's refusal to imply a private right of action in favor of
an unsuccessful tender offeror under the Williams Act thus should be
regarded as essentially an ideological and political decision;85 it was
more a reaction by the Court to expansive notions of standing and ex-
pansive interpretations of the federal securities laws8 6 than it was an
accurate reflection of the legislative intent of the Williams Act.8 7
The Court apparently had two major objectives in Chris-Craft: 1)
to deny standing to sue for damages to a tender offeror, and 2) to leave
open the question of the target's standing to sue for damages. Accord-
ingly, the Court was forced to deny that neutrality was a purpose of the
Act; had it acknowledged that neutrality was a purpose of the Act, a
holding that denied standing to a tender offeror would have required
the denial of standing to a target. Otherwise, the balance between the
two contestants would have tipped substantially in favor of the target.
82. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 29-30.
83. Id. at 42 n.28. "We hold only that a tender offeror, suing in its capacity as a take-
over bidder, does not have standing to sue for damages under Section 14(e)." Id.
84. The Supreme Court addressed the question of implied private rights of action
under the federal securities statutes in only two decisions before Chris-Craft. See supra note
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), might be interpreted as an
example of the Court's refusal to imply a right of action under Securities and Exchange
Commission rule lOb-5, but the case is more appropriately viewed as relating to the pur-
chaser-seller standing requirement of the rule.
85. The contrast between the Court's attitude toward the implication of private rights
of action in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and in Chris-Craft may be due in
large part to the transformation of the politically liberal Warren Court into the more con-
servative Burger Court. See Powell, What the Justices Are Saying.... 62 A.B.A.J. 1454,
1455 (1976). See generally Ronfeldt, Impling Rights of Action for Minorities and the Poor
Through Presumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 970 & nn.3-4 (1983).
86. The Court's decision seems to reflect concern about principles of federalism and the
need to defer to state common law remedies when feasible, and about the burden that mas-
sive litigation imposes on the federal courts. See Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439
F. Supp. 945, 953-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
87. Despite the Court's contention that it had properly determined Congress' intent in
adopting the Williams Act, Senator Williams stated that Chris-Craft "may have substan-
tially changed the contours of litigation under the tender offer statutes in a manner never
intended or envisioned by the Congress." Williams, Introduction to E. ARANOW, supra note
65, at xviii (emphasis added). One commentator, expressing surprise at the Court's treat-
ment of the legislative history, noted that "[i]t is difficult to believe that such broad remedial
legislation ... could be viewed as having a single purpose." Pitt, supra note 7, at 140 n. 173.
[Vol. 35THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In other words, if the Court had not wanted to leave open the question
of the target's standing, it could have denied standing to the tender
offeror without denying that neutrality was a purpose of the Act. For
neutrality in the takeover process can conceptually mean not only ac-
cording standing to both sides of the takeover contest but also denying
it to both sides.
Moreover, conflicting inferences can be drawn as to how the Court
would have resolved the question of a target's standing. On one hand,
the Court seemed to suggest that a party regulated by the Act would be
permitted to maintain a suit for damages if the award would "redound
to the direct benefit of the protected class," namely the shareholders.88
Since a recovery of damages by a target would inure to the benefit of
the target company shareholders, the Court's statement might imply
that a target would have standing to maintain a suit for damages. On
the other hand, the Court opined that granting standing to sue for
money damages to any contestant of the tender offer battle would not
advance the purpose of the Act.8 9 In the Court's view, the spectre of
massive damages suits by a target might well preclude some tender of-
fers from being made, thereby prejudicing shareholders rather than
providing them additional protection. 90
The Chris-Craft Court thus seems to have acknowledged, perhaps
unknowingly, that preserving the viability of takeover attempts was
part of Congress' design in adopting the Williams Act. Given its previ-
ous declaration that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Act,
however, the Court was constrained to subordinate this part of Con-
gress' design under its own narrow notion of investor protection.
Analyzed from the above perspective, the Court's purported jetti-
son of neutrality as a purpose of the Act has less significance. While it
is true that courts facing questions of standing under the Act will be
hard pressed after Chris-Craft to use neutrality as a basis for conferring
standing, Chris-Craft should not be read as a rejection by the Court of
Congress' intent to preserve the viability of takeover attempts.
88. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 39.
89. Id. at 42. In the cases decided under the Williams Act before Chris-Craft, the
courts assumed that damage suits protected investors by dint of their inherent deterrent
value, See supra text accompanying notes 66, 68. The Chris-Craft Court, however, ex-
pressed grave doubts about this assumption. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 42.
90. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 40. An argument can also be made that
tender offers are encouraged by granting standing to a tender offeror in that the offeror can
proceed with the offer knowing it will be able to protect itself under § 14(e) from the fraudu-
lent conduct of the target.
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The Cases After Chris-Craft
The type of relief, if any, available to a target and the appropriate
circumstances for granting such relief were among the issues left open
by Chris-Craft.9 1 The lower courts considering these issues have con-
strued Chris-Craft both narrowly and broadly and generally have not
reached uniform results. No court has directly addressed the issue of a
target's standing to sue for damages under sections 14(d) and 14(e) of
the Act.92 The courts, however, have both granted and denied standing
to targets to sue for equitable relief under section 14(d).93 With respect
to injunctive relief under section 14(e), one court has held standing to
be unquestioned94 and other courts have assumed standing without dis-
cussion,95 but the issue would not seem to be settled.
The courts have been virtually unanimous in refusing to imply a
right of action in damage suits by targets under section 13(d) both
before and after Chris-Craft.96 The opinions sharply diverge, however,
91. The Court specifically stated that the target's standing to sue under § 14(e) was not
at issue. Id. at 42 n.28. Further, the Court seemed favorably disposed to some injunctive
relief. Id. at 40 n.26. But if Chris-Craft is read broadly, targets will be denied standing in all
circumstances, since targets, like tender offerors, would not appear to be the "intended bene-
ficiaries" of the Williams Act.
92. But see Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating, in
dictum, that it "now seems clear that a target company ... lacks standing to bring a dam-
age action against a purchaser of its stock in a takeover or partial takeover transaction for
violations of Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Williams Act").
93. A substantial majority of the courts, however, has either explicitly or implicitly
granted standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 14(d). See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v.
Ampco-Pittsburg Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981) (assumed standing without discussion);
Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (assumed standing
without discussion); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (assumed
standing without discussion and granted an injunction). Cf E.H.I. of Fla., Inc. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 499 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that although management of a
target corporation has standing to sue, such standing is granted only to allow management to
protect the investor). But see First Ala. Bancshares v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,015 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981) (denied standing under § 14(d) as well
as under § 13(d)). Cf. Mid-Continent Bancshares v. O'Brien, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 1981) (stating, in dictum, that a target suing
on its own behalf does not have standing to seek injunctive relief for violations of§ 13(d) or
§ 14(d), but holding that since the target was suing for the benefit of its shareholders stand-
ing was proper).
94. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,878, at 94,588 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (injunction granted).
95. See, e.g., Condec Corp. v. Farley, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
99,535, at 97,100-02 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1983) (injunction denied because no irreparable
harm); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y 1982) (injunction
denied because of inadequate showing of likelihood of success, balance of equities, or irrep-
arable harm).
96. See W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
§ 10.08(b), at 79-80 (Supp. 1982).
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when targets seek injunctions under section 13(d). When presented
with such claims for equitable relief, many courts have accorded stand-
ing to the targets97 relying on pre-Chris-Craft precedents. 98 Other dis-
trict courts, however, have ruled that a target does not have standing to
sue for an injunction under section 13(d).99
97. See, e.g., Indiana Nat'1 Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983); Dan River,
Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Chro-
malloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb,
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,448 (N.D. Ohio July 27, 1983); K-N Energy
v. Gulf Interstate Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,423 (D. Colo. June
30, 1983); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Saunders
Leasing Sys. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion, 507 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Kirsch
Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980); W. A. Krueger Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800 (D. Neb. 1979); see also Trane Co.
v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aj'd, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,502 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (assuming sub silentio that a target has standing
to seek injunctive relief under § 13(d) but refusing to grant it because the target had not
established irreparable harm).
98. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972); Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
99. See, e.g., Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 99,425 (D. Utah June 24, 1983); Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,797 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 1982); First
Ala. Bancshares, Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,015
(N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981); American Bakeries Co. v. Pro-Met Trading Co., [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,925 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1981); Sta-Rite Indus. v.
Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
The seminal case for this holding appears to be Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Gateway and its progeny probably derive from the
Supreme Court's growing reluctance to imply private rights of action. Following closely on
the heels of Chris-Craft were two cases in which the Court reaffirmed its reluctance to imply
private rights of action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). The analysis of the Gateway
decision complies with that prescribed by the Supreme Court in these two cases. For a
complete analysis of Gateway and its relationship to Touche Ross and Transamerica, see
generally Note, Section 13(d) of the '34 Act: The Inference of a Private Cause ofActionfor a
Stock Issuer, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 971 (1981); Note, Standing, supra note 50, at 559-61.
The Gateway decision is instructive in that it demonstrates how a court after Chris-Craft
can use the concept of neutrality to support its decision to deny, rather than grant, standing
under the Act. In expressing its unwillingness to infer any standing for target companies
from § 13(d), the Gateway court stated:
[S]ection 13(d) fails to confer upon issuing corporations a right to sue on their
own behalf for injunctive relief. To the extent such corporations have standing
under section 13(d), it must be derivative of the shareholders' right of action. It
scarcely would further the goals of section 13(d) to permit an issuing corporation to
sue on behalf of some unidentified group of shareholders who themselves may
have no interest in pursuing an action. Indeed, .. . permitting issuing corpora-
tions to maintain such actions well might give them a competitive advantage vis-a-
vis takeover groups and thereby destroy the neutrality the Williams Act sought to
achieve.
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The MITE Decision
Although Congress took extreme care when drafting the Williams
Act not to tip the balance in favor of either target or offeror,' °0 the
scales have been upset on the state level by the enactment of state take-
over statutes. 10' In the 1982 case of Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,102 a plurality
of the Supreme Court found that an Illinois takeover statute had tipped
the balance. The Court determined that the statute was preempted by
the Williams Act because it frustrated the objectives of the Act.'0 3
Turning its attention to the Williams Act and its legislative history,
the MITE plurality stated: "There is no question that . . .Congress
intended to protect investors. But it is also crystal clear that a major
aspect of the effort to protect the investor was to avoid favoring either
management or the takeover bidder."'1 4 The opinion correctly recalled
the evolution of the Act and Congress' concern that takeover bids
should not be discouraged because of the salutary effect they have in
checking entrenched, inefficient management. 0 5 The plurality noted
that "Congress disclaimed any 'intention to provide a weapon for man-
agement to discourage takeover bids,' and expressly embraced a policy
of neutrality." 0 6
Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See infra
note 302 & accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 56-58 & accompanying text.
101. The legislative history of the Williams Act gives no indication that Congress was
aware of the existence of state takeover statutes when it adopted the Act. Although only
Virginia had passed a takeover statute before the adoption of the Williams Act, by 1981
takeover statutes were in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regu-
lation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981). For a
list of cases holding state takeover statutes constitutional or unconstitutional and/or pre-
empted by the Williams Act, see W. PAINTER, supra note 96, § 10.09, at 81 (Supp. 1982).
102. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
103. According to Justice White's plurality opinion, which was joined in its entirety only
by Chief Justice Burger, the Illinois statute upset the careful balance struck by the Williams
Act in three distinct ways and therefore was unconstitutional under the supremacy clause.
First, because the statute effectively furnished the target with additional time within which
to formulate defensive tactics, it provided incumbent management with a weapon to combat
tender offers that frustrated the goals of the Williams Act. Id. at 634-36. Second, a hearing
provision of the statute, which allowed target management to delay indefinitely a tender
offer, "upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring management at the expense of
stockholders," the statute was in conflict with the Williams Act. Id. at 636-39. Finally, the
plurality found a provision authorizing the Secretary of State to pass judgment on the sub-
stantive fairness of the tender offer to be in conflict with the Williams Act, which was in-
tended to provide investors with full and fair disclosure so they would be free to make their
own decisions. Id. at 639-40.
104. Id. at 633 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)).
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The MITE Court did not directly address its earlier rejection in
Chris-Craft of neutrality as apurpose of the Act. However, the Court
gave far more import than it did in Chris-Craft to the policy of neutral-
ity and that policy's role in protecting the process of competitive bid-
ding and the shareholders' ability to sell their shares for a premium. 0 7
The MITE plurality opinion was judiciously crafted to avoid the em-
barrassment of an explicit repudiation of the narrow view of neutrality
in Chris-Craft, yet it conveyed by its new tone and emphasis a broader
view of the role of neutrality in the takeover process.
In summary, while the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Ron-
deau, Chris-Craft, and MITE do not present an entirely clear picture of
the precise legislative intent underlying the Williams Act,10 8 it is fair to
say that the Act was designed to protect shareholders and investors in-
volved in the takeover process in two distinct ways. First, Congress
intended that investors be protected through full and fair disclosure so
that informed investment decisions could be made. Second, Congress
intended to preserve a neutral balance between incumbent manage-
ment and takeover bidders and perceived this balance as a means of
investor protection. Without a neutral balance, the takeover process
might lose viability, thus leaving unprotected the shareholder-investors'
right to dispose of their shares at a premium.
RICO
The Statutory Provisions
RICO presents a legislative scheme that is entirely different from
that of the Williams Act. RICO has been characterized as "the most
sweeping criminal statute ever passed by Congress,"10 9 and a review of
107. Id. at 633-34 & n.9.
108. In Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), the court stated in a section of its opinion entitled "Dual Purpose of the Williams
Act":
In [Chris-Craft] the Supreme Court reviewed much of the legislative history of
the Williams Act, and demonstrated that its primary purpose was to provide for
disclosure of information to shareholders. Chris-Craft dealt comprehensively,
however, only with those portions of the Act's history necessary to explain its hold-
ing that the Williams Act provides no remedy to contestants for damages caused by
its violation. While the Supreme Court has never passed upon the extent to which
the Williams Act was intended to prevent defensive tactics by target companies, its
recent decision in [MITE] reveals that important aspects of the legislative history
of the Williams Act had not been fully examined in Chris-Craft, including for ex-
ample, Congress' recognition of the importance of preventing target companies
from delaying the tender offer process.
Id at 1545 (citations omitted).
109. Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,' 18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68:
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the statutory language reveals why this description may be entirely
appropriate.
The General Structure of RICO: Section 1962
Apart from the definitions section' 10 and the criminal penalties"'
and civil remedies' 12 sections, RICO hinges on section 1962,' 13 which
makes unlawful certain pursuits by a person or entity. First, RICO's
section 1962(a) outlaws the use or investment of any income derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an en-
terprise that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce." 4 Second, section 1962(b) forbids the acquisition
or maintenance, through a pattern of racketeering activity, of an inter-
est in such an enterprise." 5 Finally, section 1962(c) prohibits con-
ducting the affairs of such an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity." 6 Thus, to establish a violation of section 1962
three elements must be proved: 1) the existence of an enterprise affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce; 2) a pattern of racketeering activity;
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1978). See
also Morrison, Old Bottle-Not So New Wine: Treble Damages in Actions Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 67, 83 (1982).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
111. Id § 1963.
112. Id § 1964.
113. Id § 1962.
114. Id. § 1962(a). Section 1962(a) prohibits investments in enterprises with funds ob-
tained illegally through a pattern of racketeering activity regardless of the legality of the
acquisition itself. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4033. Thus, it is the source of the investment capital that is the
critical element of the offense. Section 1962(a) is to be distinguished in this regard from
§ 1962(b), which focuses on illegitimate acquisition through proscribed activity. This dis-
tinction accounts for the provision in § 1962(a), which is not contained in § 1962(b), that
exempts from its prohibition the purchase on the open market of less than one percent of
any one class of outstanding securities of a company when such purchase does not confer
upon the purchaser a degree of control that would enable the purchaser to elect one or more
directors. Since under § 1962(a) the acquisition itself may be legal, although the acquisition
funds are illegitimate, the exemption "provides for the possibility of 'legitimate investment'
and draws a line of practical administration." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 159
(1969). Section 1962(b), of course, does not contain the exemption because under § 1962(b)
the acquisition is itself illegal.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976).
116. Id § 1962(c). In addition to the aforementioned subsections of § 1962 that estab-
lish RICO's substantive offenses, § 1962(d) prohibits a conspiracy to violate any one of
them. Also, all four subsections of§ 1962 provide an alternative to a pattern of racketeering
activity, namely the collection of an unlawful debt. Hence, acquiring or establishing an
enterprise with income obtained from the collection of an unlawful debt, and acquiring or
maintaining an interest in or conducting the affairs of an enterprise through the collection of
an unlawful debt, are also proscribed by the RICO statute.
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and 3) a nexus between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering
activity.
An "enterprise" is defined in section 1961 of RICO to include
"any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact al-
though not a legal entity." 17 A "pattern of racketeering activity,"
which is also defined in section 1961, requires the commission of only
two acts of "racketeering activity" within ten years of each other, one
of which occurred after the effective date of RICO.'18 -"Racketeering
activity" includes felonies chargeable under state law (such as murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, and extortion), conduct
indictable under certain federal criminal statues (such as counterfeiting,
mail fraud, wire fraud, and embezzlement from union funds), and cer-
tain offenses punishable under any law of the United States (such as
"the felonious. . . buying, selling or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
117. Id § 1961(4).
118. Id § 1961(5). The effective date of RICO was October 15, 1970. Section 1961(5)
does not indicate the degree of relatedness, if any, that must exist between the two acts of
racketeering activity to constitute a "pattern." A majority of the courts that have considered
the question has concluded that the predicate acts of racketeering activity need not them-
selves be related so long as they were committed in furtherance of the affairs of the same
enterprise. See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134,
139 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1979), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982); United States v. DePalma, 461 F.
Supp. 778, 782-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (con-
cluding that the racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some com-
mon scheme, plan, or motive in order to constitute a pattern).
The reverse question-whether two or more predicate acts committed in the course of a
single transaction or criminal episode may be treated as separate acts for purposes of estab-
lishing the requisite pattern-also has been addressed by the courts. The courts appear to be
inclined to find the acts separate, despite a close temporal proximity, as long as each act is
separately indictable, chargeable, or punishable. Apparently, mere unity of time and pur-
pose will not defeat the finding of a pattern of racketeering activity. See, e.g., United States
v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (single scheme to defraud that in-
cluded numerous acts of mail fraud constituted a pattern of racketeering activity); United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (two
acts of interstate transportation of stolen property and one of interstate travel over a five-day
period in furtherance of scheme to defraud satisfied the pattern requirement); Spencer Com-
panies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,361, at 92,214-15 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (filing of misleading Schedules 13D and
amendments thereto in violation of § 13(d) deemed to be a "pattern" of racketeering activ-
ity). But cf. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980) (indicating, without discussion, that the trial court's jury instruction had
been that nine counts of securities fraud under § 17(a) of the Securities Act constituted one
predicate act because they stemmed from the same episode).
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other dangerous drugs" and 'fraud in the sale of securities")."19 Once
the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity has
been shown, the nexus between the two must be established. 20 In sum,
a RICO violation has occurred if it can be demonstrated that the enter-
prise has been corrupted by capital from an illegitimate source, that it
has been penetrated in an illegitimate way, or that it is conducted in an
illegitimate manner.
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws as a "Pattern of Racketeering
Activity"
"[F]raud in the sale of securites. punishable under any law of
the United States" is a predicate offense under section 1961 of RICO.
Section 1961 provides cross references between specific United States
Code sections and the generic category of an offensel 2' for all offenses
indictable under specific federal criminal statutes. Section 1961 does
not provide any such cross references when the offense is one that is
punishable under any law of the United States. Thus it is necessary to
determine what constitutes "fraud in the sale of securities" and what
laws of the United States "punish" this conduct.
In addressing these questions, the two major federal securities stat-
utes, the Securities Act of 1933122 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,123 are the logical focal point. Both of these statutes, and the rules
promulgated under them, contain antifraud provisions and reporting-
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). RICO's legislative
history does not explain why Congress chose to use the terms "chargeable," "indictable,"
and "punishable" when referring to the three types of predicate offenses. One explanation is
that since the specific federal statutory offenses listed would be prosecuted by process of
indictment but the state law felonies and other violations of the laws of the United States
might not be, the more general terms "chargeable" and "punishable" were employed when
referring to these latter two groups of offenses to prevent a defendant from escaping RICO's
grasp due to a semantic technicality. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Anal-
ysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. Rav. 837, 847 n.49 (1980).
Neither a previous criminal conviction for the predicate offense nor the imposition of
criminal penalties under § 1963 is a condition precedent to a private civil RICO action.
USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Glusband v.
Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Heinold Commodities Inc. v. McCarty,
513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Il. 1979); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities Inc., 487 F. Supp.
645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D.
Del. 1978) (plaintiff need only prove the elements of a RICO violation by a preponderance
of the evidence in order to prevail).
120. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B)-(D) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
123. Id §§ 78a-78kk.
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disclosure provisions. These statutes explicitly or implicitly prohibit:
1) misrepresentations and omissions of material facts, or 2) manipula-
tive and deceptive devices and practices. In addition, both statutes im-
pose criminal penalties for violations of most of these provisions when
the civil wrongdoer has acted with scienter.124
Having identified the federal laws that punish1 25 violations of the
major antifraud and disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws,
the question remains whether violations of any of these provisions
when a sale is involved fall within the ambit of the phrase "fraud in the
sale of securities." This requires determining what constitutes "fraud"
and what constitutes a "sale" within the meaning of the statute.
The term "fraud" is nowhere defined in RICO and the legislative
records provide little aid in deciphering Congress' intent. Moreover,
the federal securities laws do not define the term. The absence of defi-
nition is troublesome since the word "fraud" has been used indiscrimi-
nately in numerous contexts and is a term "so vague that it requires
definition in nearly every case."'126 Nevertheless, the term "fraud" has
taken on a special meaning in the federal securities laws.127 Litigators
might argue that Congress intended "fraud" in RICO to have this spe-
cial meaning and that any violation of an antifraud or disclosure provi-
124. Specifically, § 24 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982), imposes criminal
penalties for willful violations of the Act and for willfully making a false or misleading
statement in a registration statement filed under the Act. Similarly, § 32(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1982), imposes criminal penalties for willful violations of
the Act and for willfully and knowingly making a false or misleading statement of a material
fact in any of the filings required under the Act.
The use of "willful" in § 24, and of "willfully" and "knowingly" in § 32(a), supplies the
scienter requirement for the punishable criminal securities law violation. Thus, for example,
a plaintiff basing a RICO claim on false or misleading material statements on a Schedule
13D or Schedule 14D would have to plead and prove that the statements were willfully and
knowingly made. On the other hand, a plaintiff basing a RICO claim on a failure to fie a
Schedule 13D or Schedule 14D would have to establish that the respective statutory provi-
sions had been willfully violated. But see Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context:
Refections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 295 n.151 (1982) (arguing that
a separate state of mind requirement should be read into RICO).
125. Violations of the federal securities laws may also be punishable under other federal
laws. The willful filing of false statements on a Schedule 13D or Schedule 14D, for example,
in addition to being punishable under § 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, is a criminal
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (imposing criminal penalties for filing false docu-
ments for the purpose of defrauding the government).
126. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 684 (4th ed. 1971).
127. See Herman & MacClean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983) ("[The an-
tifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with common law doctrines of
fraud. . . .Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify the
perceived deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing higher stan-
dards of conduct in the securities industry.").
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sion of the federal securities laws constitutes "fraud" for purposes of
the RICO statute. The alternative argument is that RICO fraud is
equivalent to the common law tort of deceit, and that unless all the
elements of that tort can be established, there has been no fraud.1 2
Under the latter view that fraud is equivalent to the common law
tort of deceit, two major points must be addressed. First, in the case of
those provisions of the federal securities laws proscribing misrepresen-
tations and omissions of material facts, 29 all of which may involve a
sale, 30 it may not be necessary to establish scienter, one of the basic
elements of a prima facie case of deceit.' 31 Although this distinction
between federal securities fraud and common law deceit may seem sig-
nificant at first, it should be remembered that violators of the above-
mentioned provisions can act with scienter, and that they must act with
scienter for their conduct to be "punishable under any law of the
United States."' 32 Thus in the context of the RICO statute the distinc-
tion is irrelevant; only intentional misrepresentations or omissions are
covered by RICO
Second, in the case of those provisions of the federal securities
128. See supra note 31 for a list of the elements of the tort of deceit. When the conduct
is willful and knowing there is no difficulty in finding the required intent to defraud. W.
PROSSER, supra note 126, § 107, at 701 & n.72.
129. See, e.g., Securities Act § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1982); Securities Ex-
change Act §§ 13(d), 14(d), 14(e) (first prong), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d), 78n(e) (first
prong) (1982); Securities and Exchange Commission rules lOb-5(b), 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.10b-5(b), 240.14a-9(a) (1983). Neither § 13(d) nor § 14(d) contains "misrepresenta-
tion" language, but a false or misleading statement with respect to a material fact contained
in a Schedule 13D or Schedule 14D would constitute a violation of § 13(d) or § 14(d). See
supra note 30 & accompanying text. In this regard, § 13(d) and §14(d), although technically
only reporting-disclosure provisions, are akin to the antifraud provisions.
130. In the case of violations of§ 14(d) or either prong of§ 14(e), if a sale does not occur
(such as when a conventional tender offer is totally unsuccessful), the violations might not
constitute the predicate offense of "fraud in the sale of securities." But see Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint at 9-11, Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) T 98, 301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981), for the
suggestion that the sale may be found if there is a "creeping" or unconventional tender offer.
See supra note 2. Cf Long, Treble Damagesfor Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A
SuggestedAnalysis andApplication ofthe RICO Civil Cause of Acdon, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201,
226 (1981) (concluding that the concept of sale is broadly defined under the federal securities
laws and therefore should encompass tender offers).
131. See supra note 37 (scienter may not be required when the violation is of the misrep-
resentation-or-omission type). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(restricting private damage actions under Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-
5(b) to cases involving allegations of scienter); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (clarifying
that scienter is an element of violations of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and rule lob-5
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought).
132. See supra note 124 & accompanying text.
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laws proscribing manipulative or deceptive devices and practices, 33 all
of which may involve a sale, violations may not always technically in-
volve another basic element of a prima facie case of deceit: a misrepre-
sentation or omission of fact. Thus, if RICO is interpreted to include
only violations containing all the elements of common law deceit, these
particular violations may be beyond RICO's intended reach.
It should be remembered, though, that in enacting the securities
laws Congress attempted to rectify perceived deficiencies in the avail-
able common law protection by proscribing a broader range of con-
duct. 34 This conduct includes, for example, manipulative practices
that have the effect of deceiving investors even when one cannot point
to an explicit misrepresentation by word or conduct. 35 It appears un-
likely that Congress meant to exclude this type of deception in RICO.
This observation is reinforced by the fact that the "manipulative"
clauses of these provisions either describe the prohibited conduct using
the words fraud, deceit, or forms of these words, or are used in tandem
with these words. 36 In summary, criminal violations of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws-including false and mislead-
ing statements in filings required by these laws-should constitute
racketeering activity, provided that the conduct is in connection with
the sale of securities.
Since the phrase "fraud in the sale of securities" employs only the
word "sale," the question arises whether a fraudulent purchase of se-
133. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1), (3) (1982);
Securities Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 14(e) (second prong), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (second
prong) (1982); Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5(a), (c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(a), (c) (1983).
134. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983).
135. Two recent cases have applied a broad definition of § 14(e) "manipulation" in
holding that certain lock-up arrangements used by target companies to thwart a tender offer
constituted a violation of § 14(e). Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Since these lock-ups may not have involved deception as a matter of law, a case can be made
that this type of manipulative act violating § 14(e) may not constitute RICO fraud. One
author endorses the Marathon court's analysis and argues that for a scheme to be manipula-
tive within the meaning of § 14(e), deception need not be present. Weiss, Defensive .Re-
sponses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L.
Rnv. 1087, 1100 (1982). But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., [Current Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,501, at 96,920 (2d Cir. Sept. 22, 1983) (stating that an essential
element of a § 14(e) cause of action is misrepresentation).
136. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 14(e) (second prong), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (second prong) (1982); Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5(a),
(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (1983). One commentator, however, believes that Con-
gress' use of the disjunctive in the second prong of § 14(e) suggests that "deceptive" and
"manipulative" acts are different kinds of behavior. Weiss, supra note 135, at 1097.
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curities is within RICO's coverage. Although there are appealing argu-
ments supporting a restrictive reading of the language, 137 the most
reasonable interpretation of the phrase is the expansive one. Even
though the phrase appears on its face to limit RICO's scope to fraudu-
lent acts in connection with the sale of securities, it is axiomatic that
every sale involves a purchase. Furthermore, although there is no in-
structive piece of legislative history, it would seem that RICO's overrid-
ing concern with deterring acquisitions by "racketeers" 13 8 belies any
construction of "fraud in the sale of securities" that does not encompass
a purchase. Specifically, such a construction would restrict the scope of
section 1962(b)'s prohibition of the acquisition of an interest in an en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Indeed, an acquisi-
tion of an interest in an enterprise through a fraudulent securities
transaction would almost always be by a purchase and seldom by a
sale.
Criminal Penalties and Civil Remedies for PICO Violations
For a violation of RICO, section 1963139 authorizes criminal sanc-
tions including fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of interests wrong-
fully acquired or maintained.' 4° Section 1964, the civil remedies
section, permits suits both by the government and by private parties.141
137. The rationale for giving the phrase its literal meaning is that had Congress intended
to include fraud in the purchase of securities it could have done so by simply adding the
word. Indeed, the RICO predicate offense adjacent to "fraud in the sale of securities" is the
felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs." 18 U.S.C. 1961()0)) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(emphasis added).
Furthermore, Congress expressly included both purchases and sales in various provi-
sions of the securities statutes, which may suggest that its failure to do so in RICO was
purposeful. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (making it
unlawful to use "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security, manipulative or
deceptive devices); Securities Exchange Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1982) (authorizing
national securities exchanges to permit odd-lot dealers "to buy and sell" securities for their
own accounts); Securities Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982) (making it unlawful "to offer
to sell or offer to buy" unregistered securities through use of prospectus); Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1982) (prohibiting an investment adviser
from effecting "any sale or purchase of any security" for a person other than his or her client
in the absence of certain disclosures).
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
139. Id. § 1963.
140. The Supreme Court has agreed to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals
about whether the term "interest" in § 1963(a) includes all income and profits derived from
the pattern of racketeering activity or is limited to interests in the enterprise. See United
States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981) and 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted
sub non. Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
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Its language, however, is opaque. Section 1964(a) confers jurisdiction
on the federal district courts to order equitable relief for RICO viola-
tions and contains a non-exhaustive list of equitable remedies that may
be granted. It does not, however, specify for whom the equitable relief
is available. Although section 1964(b) provides that the government
may institute proceedings to obtain an equitable order, section 1964(c),
which deals with suits brought by private parties, does not clarify
whether a private suit in equity is expressly authorized. It provides that
"any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962. . .may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."' 142 Should
this provision be read as permitting both treble damages and equitable
relief, or should it be read as authorizing only a damages remedy? Al-
though the legislative history does not provide a definitive answer,143
142. Id § 1964(c) (emphasis added). The exact nature of the injury, the degree of causa-
tion, and standing requirements were not clarified by the statute's drafters, and this lack of
clarification has generated much confusion among the courts. See infra notes 186-93 & ac-
companying text.
143. Congress never debated whether § 1964(c) includes a private right of action for
equitable relief, and congressional action on the matter has created ambiguity. Senate Bill
30, which was ultimately enacted into law as the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, see
infra notes 152-53 & accompanying text, did not contain on its face any provision for a
private right of action when it was passed by the Senate. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 827 (1969). When S. 30 was sent to the House, the President of the ABA recom-
mended that § 1964 be amended to provide for the additional civil remedy of private treble
damage suits. Organized Crime Controk Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 543-44 (1970)
(testimony of ABA President-elect Edward L. Wright) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
The logical inference to be drawn from his characterization of the proposal is that private
equitable remedies were already contemplated by the bill. The proposal was adopted and
the present version of § 1964(c) was added by the House Committee on the Judiciary. See
H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 114, at 18.
Yet, several of the predecessors of S. 30 did contain a specific provision permitting
private injunctive relief. See, e.g., S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c), 115 CONG. REc. 6996
(1969); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1967). Also, bills had been submitted in the
House that specifically provided for injunctive relief. See, e.g., H.R. 19215, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), which included in its § 1964(e) a private right of action to sue for injunctive
relief in addition to the provision now set out in § 1964(c). Moreover, Representative Stei-
ger proposed an amendment to S. 30 during the House debates that would have specifically
inserted language providing for private injunctive relief. 116 CONG. REc. 35,346 (1970).
After RICO's enactment, the Senate passed two bills to amend the statute to provide for
private injunction suits. S. 16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 29,368-69 (1972); S. 13,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 10,319-21 (1973). The House took no action on either
bill. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1070, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972). The legislative records,
however, suggest that the bills were designed to clarify § 1964 and frame RICO so that its
structure was parallel to the antitrust laws. See Victims of Crime: Hearings on S. 16, S. 33, S.
750, S. 1946, S. 2087, S. 2426, S. 2748, S. 2856, S. 2994, and S. 2995 Before the Subcomm. on
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the language and structure of the section suggest that equitable relief
should be available to private plaintiffs.'"
The provision for a private right of action for RICO violations is
written in the conjunctive. The first part of the sentence before the and
("any person. . . may sue") creates a general right to sue for all appro-
priate remedies, including damages and equitable relief. The second
part of the sentence is a specific statutory grant permitting the recovery
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist & 2d
Sess. 327-28, 333, 336 (1971-1972).
The above-described legislative action and inaction could support both an inference
that § 1964(c) provides equitable relief and an inference that it does not. Congress may
never have inserted a specific provision regarding equitable relief because it thought such
action would be redundant vis-a-vis § 1964(c) or because it thought § 1964(c) did not grant
the right to sue in equity and it did not want private parties to have such a right. The fact
that § 1964(c) was added by the House, late in the bill's history, long after § 1964(a) and
§ 1964(b) had been drafted by the Senate, perhaps accounts for the lack of parallelism in
language and structure between the government and private remedies subsections. Hence
the specific inclusion of equitable remedies in § 1964(b) and the failure to reference such
remedies specifically in § 1964(c) may have been more a function of drafting technique than
an indication of any intent.
144. RICO's liberal construction directive supports this conclusion. See infra note 150.
Also, a number of courts seem inclined to permit equitable relief, and the commentators, in
general, have concurred. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'din
part, ajf'dinpart on rehearing en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983) (declining to answer the "diffi-
cult question" of whether equitable relief is available to private plaintiffs because the issue
was not before the court but noting one piece of scholarship that indicated that such relief is
available); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (assuming,
without discussion, that a preliminary injunction could issue under RICO but declining to
grant one because plaintiff had not shown irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the
merits, or that the equities tipped in its favor); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (assuming, without discussion,
that preliminary injunctive relief would be available to private plaintiffs under RICO but
refusing to issue a preliminary injunction because plaintiff failed to show a substantial likeli-
hood it would succeed on the merits); United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D.
W.Va. 1979) (dictum that private parties are entitled to § 1964 (a) equitable remedies). But
see Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983) (indicating, in dictum, that
there is "substantial doubt whether RICO grants private parties. . . a cause of action for
equitable relief"); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y 1983),
aft'd, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,502 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (expres-
sing serious doubt as to the propriety of a private plaintiff invoking RICO to secure injunc-
tive relief); Kanshal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(holding that injunctive relief may not be granted).
The scholarship cited in Bennett v. Berg is Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and CivilRemedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
1009, 1014, 1038 nn.132-33, 1047 n.197 (1980). It is noteworthy that Professor Blakey was
Chief Counsel in 1969 and 1970 to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures, which drafted RICO, and is often considered the author of the statute. See also
Blakey, supra note 124, at 330-41; MacIntosh, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act: Powerful Tool ofthe Defrauded Securities Plaintiff, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 7,58-59 (1982);
Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19
AM. CpiM. L. REv. 655, 709-15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Strafer].
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of treble damages and attorneys' fees, neither of which would be avail-
able without the specific provision. The second part of the sentence
should be viewed not as restricting the right to sue but rather as creat-
ing an additional remedy. Moreover, even if one concludes that the
statute does not afford private plaintiffs an express equitable remedy,
an equitable right of action might be implied under a court's general
equitable powers. 145
Legislative History: The Scope of RICO 146
Ascertaining Congress' general purpose in enacting RICO is not
difficult. The title under which RICO was passed, the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970,147 contains a Statement of Findings and
Purpose covering all its provisions:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. 148
According to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, RICO seeks to
eliminate "the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into le-
gitimate organizations."' 149 Aside from a liberal construction provision
of the Organized Crime Control Act,150 however, neither the RICO
provisions nor the above-cited statement of purpose provides an une-
quivocal indication of the intended scope of RICO. Turning to the
legislative history for guidance, we will narrow our inquiry to two is-
145. Presumably, a court would apply the test set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974),
in deciding whether to imply a private right of action under RICO for equitable relief. See
supra note 81. In applying the second prong of the test (te., is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one?), a court
may find that by expressly providing a damages remedy for private litigants and equitable
remedies for the government, Congress implicitly intended that a private right of action for
equitable relief should not be implied.
146. For a summary of the legislative history of RICO, see Blakey, supra note 124, at
249-80; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 144, at 1014-21. For a list of legislative materials on
RICO, see Strafer, supra note 144, at 680 n.193.
147. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-47 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
148. Id. § 1, 84 Stat. at 923 (reproduced but not codified following 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1976)).
149. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 114, at 76.
150. Section 904(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 instructs that the statute
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970). For a detailed discussion of this liberal construction directive, see
Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980). See also
Note, Liberal Construction of Title IX of The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: Section
904(a) v. the Doctrine of Strict Construction, 12 RUTGERS L. J. 69 (1980).
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sues: whether Congress intended to limit RICO to activities involving
organized crime, and to what extent Congress intended that RICO em-
brace violations of the federal securities laws.151
No Organized Crime Limitation
Congressional concern about the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate business led Senator John McClellan to introduce Sen-
ate Bill 30 (the Organized Crime Control Act) in 1969.152 After numer-
ous revisions and the incorporation of the RICO provisions, the bill
was enacted the following year.153
The legislative history of the bill ineluctably supports the view that
while Congress had set out to attack the problem of organized crime, it
realized that the only feasible and effective way to accomplish this ob-
jective was to enact legislation that had a broad reach and that was not
circumscribed by a requirement that a statutory violator be tied to or-
ganized crime. 154 RICO's drafters were aware that any attempt to limit
the statute's application to organized crime would create constitutional
problems. If a tie to organized crime were the linchpin of a RICO
violation and the term organized crime was not defined, the statute
would probably be void for vagueness. On the other hand, if organized
crime were defined, it would have to be in terms of a certain type of
association, subjecting the statute to constitutional scrutiny for creating
a status offense.1 55 Furthermore, Congress realized that even if it were
151. Our specific concern is Congress' intent regarding private civil RICO suits. Be-
cause § 1964(c), the private civil remedies provision, was inserted late in the bil's history, see
supra note 143 and infra note 153, much of the legislative history centers on the govern-
ment's use of the criminal and civil provisions. Thus, there are inherent limitations to the
use of RICO's legislative history as an indicator of congressional intent regarding private
RICO suits. However, it would seem that since § 1964(c) was incorporated into a previously
aired bill, what Congress had to say about governmental RICO could apply equally to pri-
vate RICO. See supra note 143.
152. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 827 (1969).
153. The measure was indeed enacted expeditiously. Having received S. 30 from the
House just before the end of the session, the Senate decided to concur with the House ver-
sion, which had added § 1964(c), without asking for a conference. See Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 144, at 1021 & n.69.
154. For the proposition that RICO's legislative history rejects an organized crime limi-
tation, see Blakey, supra note 124, at 249-80; MacIntosh, supra note 144, at 62-64; Strafer,
supra note 144, at 680-88; Note, Civil RICO.. The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARv. L. Rnv. 1101, 1106-09 (1982).
155. For example, a proposed amendment making membership in the Mafia or La Cosa
Nostra-type organizations unlawful received considerable criticism on the ground that its
terms were "imprecise, uncertain, and unclear," 116 CONG. REC. 35,343-44 (1970), and that
making mere membership in an organization a criminal offense raised serious constitutional
questions in light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (striking down a statute that created a status offense), and Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
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able to define organized crime in a way that would satisfy constitu-
tional standards, members of organized crime could easily modify their
behavior to fall outside the definition, or suppress evidence of their
proscribed associations.' 56
All of these considerations pointed to the same conclusion: RICO
could not have an organized crime limitation. Thus, even though the
statute's statement of purpose focused on organized crime, the opera-
tional provisions of the statute were drafted and passed without a single
reference to the term. 157 Consequently, RICO has a very broad reach.
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws and RICO
RICO's predicate offense of "fraud in the sale of securities . . .
punishable under any law of the United States" was not included in the
original bill.158 At the time it was added, other federal predicate of-
fenses had already been defined in terms of specific statutory sec-
tions, 59 and Congress was succumbing to pressure from the Justice
Department to make the state predicate offenses more explicit.1 60
Given this legislative milieu, Congress' omission of any statutory refer-
ence to federal securities fraud seems purposeful and suggests that the
offense was intended to embrace any fraudulent sale of securities that
306 U.S. 451 (1939) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that made membership in certain
gangs illegal), 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970). The amendment was rejected. Id at 35,346.
156. See, e.g., 116 CONG. Rac. 586, 601 (1970).
157. The views of both proponents and critics support the proposition that Congress
rejected an organized crime limitation and that RICO covers the white collar criminal as
well as the organized one. Senator McClellan admitted that the statute would "have some
application to individuals who are not members of La Cosa Nostra or otherwise engaged in
organized crime." 116 CONG. REc. 18,945 (1970). In his view, however, this was "not a
reason to cut back its scope." Id.
Senators Hart and Kennedy, acknowledging the problems associated with organized
crime, protested that the "reach of [the] bill [went] beyond organized criminal activity." S.
REP. No. 617, supra note 114, at 215. Similarly, Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan,
all opponents of the House bill, stated: "[We] may welcome an organized crime member's
conviction, but the title makes no discrete segregation of mobsters. It is a tool to be em-
ployed for all." H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 114, at 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4083.
158. See S. 2048, S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REc. 6,995-96 (1969); S. 1861, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9,568-71 (1969).
159. Compare S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1961(1)(D), S. REP. No. 617,supra note 114,
at 21-22, with S. 30, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 1961()(B)-(C), id. at 21, and S. 1861, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 1961(1)(B), 115 CONG. REc. 9,569 (1969).
160. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 114, at 121-22. Senate Bill 1861, RICO's immedi-
ate predecessor, had defined "racketeering activity" as "any act involving the danger of
violence to life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year." S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1961(1)(A), 115
CONG. REc. 9,569 (1969). "Racketeering activity" also included acts indictable under spe-
cific sections of title 18 of the U.S.C. Id. § 1961(1)(B), 115 CONG. REC. 9,569 (1969).
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was punishable under federal law. The statutory phrase "any offense
involving. . . fraud in the sale of securities"' 161 and the statutory com-
mand of liberal construction 162 buttress this inference of congressional
intent.
Congressional commentary on this predicate offense, however, is
limited and supports no clear inference. The available remarks do
manifest a congressional concern with misappropriation 63 and unlaw-
ful hypothecation of securities,164 and with manipulation of the market
prices of stock.' 65 Moreover, references exist to both sales and
purchases, 166 suggesting that Congress may have intended RICO to en-
compass fraud in both the sale and purchase of securities, despite the
absence of the word "purchase" from the statute.
Commentary regarding violations of specific provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws is particularly scant. Aside from several passing
references in the legislative record to securities fraud cases, 167 there is
only one explicit reference to the federal securities laws: "Against the
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
162. See supra note 150 & accompanying text.
163. The House and Senate Reports both alluded to securities thefts as a modus operandi
of organized crime. The Senate Report quoted J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI: "We have over
30 pending cases (March 1, 1969) involving thefts of securities from brokerage houses. Close
associates and relatives of La Cosa Nostra figures are known to be involved in at least 11 of
these cases." S. REP. No. 617, supra note 114, at 77. Theft of securities does not constitute a
violation of the federal securities laws per se. In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion expressly denies any direct responsibility in the area of stolen securities. See 38 SEC
ANN. REP. 87-88 (1973).
164. The House Report referred to recent cases of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion that suggested that members of organized crime were stealing securities and pledging
them as collateral with banks for loans. H.R. REP. No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55
(1968).
165. Congress was reminded that, in addition to stealing securities, organized crime syn-
dicates manipulated stock market prices "by buying andselling in large blocks in closely held
stocks." Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on Bills Relating to Organized
Crime Activities. . . Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1970) (statement of Att'y Gen. Mitchell)
(emphasis added). Congress was also told that "tihe investor may be unaware of stock
market manipulations resulting from massivepurchases and/or sales of securities by organ-
ized crime syndicates." 116 CONG. Rc. 820 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Scott) (emphasis
added).
166. See supra note 165.
167. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 143, at 370 ("[Racketeering activity] would
seem to apply to a theft from an interstate shipment, regardless of the value of the property
stolen, and unlawful use of a stolen telephone credit card-the "Mom and Pop" variety of
illegal gambling business, the local numbers place, a securities fraud case. . . .") (remarks
of Sheldon H. Eisen, Chairman, Comm. on Fed. Legislation of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York) (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 617, supra note 114, at 158
(reference to securities fraud in section analysis).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
background of expanding securities regulation, this definition [of rack-
eteering activity] could include the various officers, directors and em-
ployees of corporations and underwriters of securities who have been
found guilty of fraud in the sale of securities in some of the recent Rule
10[b-5] cases." 168 The fact that there is no unequivocal indication of
Congress' intent to include federal securities law violations involving
fraud within RICO's bounds cannot be ignored. 69 However, since
these violations fall within the letter of the statute and since there is no
evidence that Congress intended to exclude them, we suggest that the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended RICO's predicate
offense of "fraud in the sale of securities" and the federal securities
laws to be construed in pari materia.
In summary, two observations seem plain from our review of
RICO's core provisions and legislative history. First, although Con-
gress' stated purpose in enacting RICO was the eradication of organ-
ized crime from the American economy, the statutory provisions never
expressly mention organized crime. Second, RICO did not create a new
substantive criminal offense. Indeed, it is not even a criminal statute.
Instead, it is a remedial statute that authorizes criminal penalties or
civil remedies for conduct that violates existing state or federal law. 170
168. House Hearings, supra note 143, at 401 (text of report adopted by the Comm. on
Fed. Legislation of the New York County Lawyers' Ass'n). It is noteworthy that this sole
explicit reference in RICO's legislative history to a specific provision of the federal securities
laws is contained in an evaluation that is critical of RICO's potential scope. Also, the report
alluded only to cases involving fraud in the sale of securities-no mention was made of
fraud in thepurchase of securities.
In a House report relating to the effort of federal agencies to combat organized crime,
there is an oblique reference to the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and
the prophylactic effect these requirements can have on organized crime's "working its way
into mutual funds" and marketing securities publicly. See H.R. REP. No. 1574, supra note
164, at 55.
169. The author of Note, RICO and Securities Fraud- .4 Workable Limitation, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1513 (1983), argues, based on the legislative history, that the courts should
limit the predicate offense of securities fraud to those activities that are identical or analo-
gous to the type of securities fraud that Congress believed is practiced by organized crime
(i.e., stolen securities and market manipulation, which are specifically mentioned in the leg-
islative history, and offenses that involve multiple acts and roles that are analogous to those
mentioned). But see Note, supra note 154, at 1119 & n.95, which argues that if RICO's scope
is to be limited, Congress, not the courts, must do so. The Note also suggests that Congress
could limit actionable violations of the securities laws to the theft of securities, stock market
manipulation through corrupt brokerage activity, or "planned" bankruptcies.
170. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 144, at 1021 n.71; State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (noting that acts in viola-
tion of § 1962 are unlawful, not criminal). But see Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (noting that RICO is primarily a criminal statute); Waterman Steamship
Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 259 (E.D. La. 1981) (indicating that
RICO actually creates substantive federal criminal offenses).
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It would seem that Congress created a broad and sweeping statute, one
with the potential to impose liability on parties having no apparent re-
lationship to organized crime and one that provides an additional civil
remedy for violations of certain state and federal laws, including the
federal securities laws, and more specifically, the Williams Act.' 7 '
Judicial Construction of RICO
The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of RICO in a
criminal RICO case, United States v. Turkette.172 The Turkette Court
did not address whether Congress intended to limit the application of
RICO to suits in which the defendant has an affiliation with organized
crime, and did not examine what Congress meant by "fraud in the sale
of securities." Yet the Turkette decision may suggest how the Supreme
Court would respond to these questions because of its broad interpreta-
tion of RICO in another context.
In Turkette, the defendant was charged with conspiring to conduct
the affairs of an illegitimate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activities including drug trafficking, arson-for-profit, and insurance
fraud. 173 The issue before the Court was whether the definition of en-
terprise should be limited to legitimate enterprises.' 74 The Court found
that the statutory language was basically unambiguous and revealed no
intention to exclude illegitimate enterprises from the sweep of the defi-
nition.' 75 The Court bolstered its interpretation by reciting RICO's de-
clared purpose, which the Court characterized as broad,' 76 and by
citing numerous congressional statements made during the considera-
tion of the RICO bill. None of this, in the Court's view, required a
conclusion that RICO was confined to legitimate enterprises. 177
Lower federal courts both before and after Turkette have consid-
ered whether there is an organized crime limitation in RICO and
171. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that if RICO has a heyday, it may prove to
be what Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 was in its day. Morrison, supra
note 109, at 83.
172. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The Court will have a second opportunity to review RICO
when it decides United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981) and 681 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. grantedsub nonz. Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983). See supra
note 140.
173. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579.
174. Id. at 578.
175. Id. at 587 & n.10. The Court noted that Congress could have narrowed the sweep
of the statute by inserting a single word, "legitimate," in the definition of enterprise. Id. at
581.
176. Id. at 589.
177. Id. at 589-91.
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whether RICO encompasses violations of the federal securities laws.
Generally, the lower courts have reached results consistent with the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of RICO in Turkette.
First, in criminal RICO cases, the federal courts have unani-
mously rejected an organized crime limitation. 178 A majority of the
courts deciding civil RICO cases have similarly refused to impose such
a limitation. 79 These courts have construed RICO broadly and have
recognized that RICO prohibits certain conduct and not a certain sta-
tus.'80 There are, however, a handful of courts that have insisted that
178. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1983) (dic-
tum); United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1055 (1981); United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub noma. Crude Oil Co. v. United States, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United
States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d
352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Matthews v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980); United States
v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp.
1091, 1096 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976).
179. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,478, at 96,762 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983); Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-54 (7th Cir.
1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 177 (1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'dinpart, af'd in part
on rehearing en bane, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983); Ralston v. Kirk, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Windsor Assoc. v. Greenfield, 564 F. Supp. 273, 278 (D. Md. 1983); In re
Longhorn Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,537, at 97,117 (D.
Okla. July 28, 1983); Taylor v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,533, at 97,093 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1983); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,510, at 96,952 (W.D. Mich. Sept.
13, 1983); Dakis v. Chapman, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,498, at 96,894
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 99,475, at 96,736-37 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express
Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,530 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1983);
Haber v. Kobrin, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,259, at 96,163-
64 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1983); Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co., [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,145, at 95,525 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1983)
(dictum); Crocker Nat'I Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 229-31 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F.
Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Liston v. USLIFE Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,033, at 94,916 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v.
Noren Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 98,742, at
93,737 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp.
1061, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Spencer Companies
v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361
at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645,
646 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Il.
1979).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); Spencer
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civil RICO litigation must fail unless it can be established that the de-
fendant is a member of a structured criminal organization.' 8' These
courts reason that despite Congress' purposeful failure to require that
racketeering activity be tied to organized crime, the expressed legisla-
tive intent was that RICO should apply only to actions involving or-
ganized crime activities. Courts limiting RICO in this way would be
forced to apply general criteria on a case-by-case basis and impose lia-
bility based on their tacit determination of which defendants are affili-
ated with organized crime.182 Such an approach is contrary to the
precise objectives that led Congress to draft RICO as it did; ad hoc
adjudication would permit some organized criminals to escape RICO
liability and could eventually transform a RICO offense into a consti-
tutionally suspect status offense. 83
Second, no court has held that Congress intended to exclude viola-
tions of the federal securities laws from RICO's coverage. Indeed, a few
courts have explicitly or implicitly held that RICO's predicate offense
of "fraud in the sale of securities" encompasses violations of the federal
securities laws. These cases consist of civil RICO claims predicated on
intentional violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.184
Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) J 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
181. The federal district court for the Southern District of New York, in Barr v.
WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), was the first court to require the plaintiff in
a civil RICO action to prove a connection between the defendant and organized crime.
Notwithstanding the rejection of the Barr limitation by a majority of courts, including the
court for the Southern District of New York, see supra note 179, a few recent cases apply the
limitation. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton Co., 566 F. Supp. 636,642-44 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Minpeco v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Wagner
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,032, at
94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1982); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D.
La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. I11. 1981).
182. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),a f'd
on other grounds, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,478 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983).
183. See supra notes 154-57 & accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,444 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1983) (RICO claim based on Securities and
Exchange Commission rule lob-5 survived motion to dismiss); Trane Co. v. O'Connor See.,
561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aft'd, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,502
(2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (RICO claim predicated on Securities Exchange Act §§ 9(a)(2), 10(b)
dismissed for failure to state a claim under the securities laws; RICO claim based on § 13(d)
was not addressed by the court); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), ajf'd, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983)
(RICO claim based on Securities Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 14(e) and Securities and Exchange
Commission rules lOb-5, 14e-3 dismissed for failure to state a claim under the securities
laws); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (RICO claim based on Securities
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A number of courts, however, have refused to recognize a RICO
claim based on a federal securities law violation, even though such a
claim falls within the express language of the statute. These courts
have limited RICO's civil application by either imposing an organized
crime requirement, 8 5 or a standing-causation requirement 186 that has
the effect of remedying only a certain type of injury. The decisions of
the courts following this latter approach are far from uniform. Never-
theless, they all seem to indicate a desire to preclude RICO claims
when section 1962 has been violated but the named plaintiff in the
RICO suit has suffered injury only from the section 1961 predicate of-
fenses constituting the pattern of racketeering activity.' 8 7 Some of
these courts have stated that the injury to be redressed in a RICO se-
curities suit must occur "by reason of' a violation of section 1962, that
is, the injury must be a "racketeering enterprise injury."' 88 Other
courts have required "competitive injury" or "infiltration."'' 8 9 A few
Act § 17(a) and Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) survived motion to dismiss); Marshall Field
& Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court apparently ignored allegations that
§ 13(d) violations supported a claim of relief under RICO); Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (same); Hanna
Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982) (RICO claim based on §§ 13(d), 14(e) survived
motion to dismiss); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (RICO claim predicated
on Securities Act § 17(a) and Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) survived motion to dismiss);
Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (RICO claim based on § 13(d) survived
motion to dismiss); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978)
(RICO claim based on Securities Act §§ 5, 12, and 17 and Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion rule lob-5 dismissed on grounds of improper venue).
185. See supra notes 181-82 & accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 187-92 & accompanying text.
187. One court has taken a slightly different approach in holding that the plaintiff must
be a direct victim of the defendant's actions. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d
449,457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982) (denying a RICO claim by auditors of a
criminal enterprise). But see Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1983) (ac-
cepting a "by reason of a violation of § 1962" requirement but rejecting a "competitive
injury" requirement, see infra notes 188-89 & accompanying text).
188. See, e.g., Dakis v. Chapman, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,498,
at 96,895 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1983); Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,145, at 95,525-26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb,
Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981). See also Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a f'd on other grounds,
[Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1983) (suggesting, in
dictum, that RICO claims can be effectively limited by requiring the plaintiff to show that
the injury resulted from a violation of § 1962 and not simply from a violation of § 1961).
189. See, e.g., Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 98,361, at 92,216-17 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (accepting,
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courts have indicated that RICO was not intended "as an alternative or
cumulative remedy for private plaintiffs alleging securities fraud."'190
While there is considerable merit to these restrictive interpreta-
tions of RICO, 191 they seem to be employed only when the alleged in-
jury stems from the section 1961 predicate offenses, and not from the
section 1962 violation. 92 Accordingly, these cases should not be read
as a blanket denial of RICO suits based on violations of the federal
securities laws. For example, when intentional violations of the federal
securities laws facilitate the takeover of a corporation, both the section
arguendo, the "competitive injury" requirement developed in North Barrington Dev. v.
Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. IM. 1980), a non-securities RICO case, but also creating an
alternative requirement, namely, that plaintiff allege infiltration of its business by the de-
fendant). For a discussion of this aspect of the Spencer case, see infra text accompanying
notes 237-40.
190. See, e.g., Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,834, at 94,291 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (dictum); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (RICO not intended "as an alternative, or
cumulative, remedy"). Bayly relies somewhat blindly on,4dair. Adair makes the most sense
when read, not as refusing to recognize securities claims in RICO cases, but as limiting
RICO securities claims to those cases in which the injury results from a violation of § 1962
(since the alleged injury in Adair stemmed from the § 1961 pattern of racketeering activity
itself, not from the violation of § 1962) and/or as imposing an organized crime limitation.
See Noland v. Gurley, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,439, at 96,503 (D.
Colo. June 15, 1983). But see Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CORP. L. 411, 431 (1983) (suggesting
that Adair be interpreted as precluding a securities-based RICO claim). Professor Blakey
criticizes theAdair decision and argues that had Congress not intended RICO to provide an
alternative or cumulative remedy to federal or state law, it would not have been necessary
for Congress to provide expressly that RICO does not supersede any federal or state law
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies. Blakey, supra note 124, at 264 n.78,
268 n.92. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970).
191. See Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962
and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100, 125-30 (1981) (restrictive approach is required by the
plain language of the statute and its legislative history). But see Blakey, supra note 124, at
255 n.52, 276-77 n. 119; MacIntosh, supra note 144, at 56-58; Strafer, supra note 144, at 688-
703; Note, supra note 154, at 1109-15, 1119-20, which all take the opposite view. Cf.
Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772, at 93,922-
23 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982). There are several RICO securities cases that reject or seem
inclined to reject the restrictive approach. See, e.g., Mauriber v. Shearson/American Ex-
press Co., [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,444, at 96,531-32 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal.
1982); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 229-31 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,742, at
93,738 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
192. If plaintiff shareholder X of corporation Y is defrauded in sales of its stock in
corporation Y by defendant racketeer Z, and as a result of the sales racketeer Z acquires an
interest in corporation Y, even though § 1962(b) has been violated plaintiff shareholder X
can only allege injuries stemming from the § 1961 predicate offenses of "fraud in the sale of
securities."
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
WILLIAMS ACT & RICO
1961 pattern of racketeering activity and section 1962 prohibited activ-
ity can be established. The injury to the corporation stemming from
each activity is distinct and different. 93 In such circumstances, it is
patently erroneous to say that "racketeering enterprise injury" or
"competitive injury" cannot be feasibly alleged by the corporation or
that the corporation's remedy for the section 1962 violation is
equivalent to the remedy that would issue for the section 1961 pattern
of securities fraud alone.
In sum, the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of RICO in
Turkette generally has been echoed by the lower federal courts. A ma-
jority of the courts has at least rejected an organized crime limitation in
RICO suits, and there appears to be a judicial predilection to recognize
a violation of the federal securities laws as a RICO predicate offense.
The Williams Act and RICO
Two reported cases have reached the conclusion that an inten-
tional violation of the Williams Act may constitute the racketeering
activity of "fraud in the sale of securities": Spencer Companies v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. 194 and Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy
Resources Ltd.195 We discuss these cases in some detail for two pur-
poses: to illustrate how RICO and Williams Act claims are used to-
gether in the same litigation, and to provide a basis for our later
discussion of why RICO suits predicated on Williams Act violations
undermine the Act's policy of neutrality, and why this policy should
prevail over RICO policies when litigants rely on both statutes.
Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Ca, Inc. 196
Spencer Companies (Spencer) is a publicly-held Massachusetts
193. If plaintiff corporation Y is defrauded in stock sales at a price below fair market
value, the measure of damages stemming from the § 1961 activity (assuming such a suit is
permissible) would be the fair market value of the stock less the sales price. The damages to
corporation Y stemming from the § 1962 activity, however, would be similar to those recov-
ered in an antitrust suit and would be measured by the damage to the corporation Y's busi-
ness attributable to the purchaser's acquisition of the stock.
194. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981).
195. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982).
196. The litigation in Spencer comprises numerous decisions and a variety of issues.
The published decisions, in chronological order, include: the Williams Act count, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981); the
RICO count, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9198,361 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 1981); Agency's motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the
Massachusetts takeover statute, Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 542 F. Supp. 231 (D.
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corporation engaged in the business of selling discount shoes and wo-
men's clothing. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (Agency) is a Delaware cor-
poration engaged in the interstate business of renting automobiles. 97
In February 1981, Agency began to purchase Spencer shares on the
open market, 198 a common harbinger of a contemplated tender offer.
The tender offer was not actually announced until almost a year
later. 199 In the interim, Spencer brought suit against Agency, its chair-
man of the board and sole shareholder, Samuel Frankino, and its presi-
dent, Russell Smith.200 Spencer alleged that the defendants had
willfully violated section 13(d) of the Williams Act by filing false and
misleading Schedules 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.20 1 Spencer further alleged that the defendants had violated all
three substantive RICO provisions by acquiring an interest in Spencer
through, or with the income from, a pattern of racketeering activity,
and by conducting the affairs of Agency through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.20 2 Spencer contended that the requisite pattern of racke-
Mass. 1982) (preliminary injunction issued; takeover statute preempted by the Williams
Act); Memorandum and Order on Spencer's motion for a preliminary injunction based on
the Williams Act count, Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237
(D. Mass. 1982) (preliminary injunction issued); appeal from district court's issuance of a
preliminary injunction enjoining state officials from enforcing state takeover statute, Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (preliminary injunction vacated;
takeover statute not preempted by the Williams Act; remanded).
There are four unreported opinions: Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
No. 81-2097-S, slip op. (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 1982) (available June 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., No. 2097-S, slip op. (D.
Mass. Dec. 7, 1981) (available June 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Spencer Companies, No. 81-2542-S, slip op. (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 1981)
(available June 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Spencer Companies v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., No. 81-2097-S, slip op. (D. Mass. Oct. 7, 1981) (available June 1, 1982, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
197. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301, at 91,894 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
198. Id
199. By mid-November 1981, Agency had acquired approximately 38% of Spencer's
outstanding shares. On January 27, 1982, Agency publicly announced its cash tender offer
to acquire 250,000 shares of Spencer stock at $15 a share. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Con-
noliy, 542 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D. Mass. 1982).
200. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,301, at 91,894 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
201. Id. Spencer also alleged that the defendants had violated §§ 9(a)(2), 14(d), and
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. The § 14(d) count was not addressed by the court, and
the § 14(e) count was not even mentioned in the reported decision. The § 9(a)(2) count was
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 91,896. See
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 9-11, Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
202. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215-16 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
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teering activity was established by the alleged violations of section
13(d) in connection with the purchase of Spencer shares and similar
earlier violations of section 13(d) in connection with the purchase of
stock in another company, Gateway Industries. 20 3 Spencer sought pre-
liminary injunctive relief for the Williams Act violations and damages
for the RICO claim.204 Agency moved to dismiss both counts. 20 5
The Williams Act Count
Agency based its motion to dismiss the Williams Act count on
Spencer's lack of standing, as a target, to seek an injunction under sec-
tion 13(d). 206 In support of its motion, Agency relied on the Supreme
Court's restrictive approach to implied rights of action in .iper v. Chris-
Craft Industries207 and the lower court opinions rendered after Chris-
Craft that had applied this approach to deny targets standing to sue for
an injunction under section 13(d).20 1 The Spencer court, however, was
not persuaded by Agency's argument and denied its motion, citing the
Supreme Court's implicit recognition of a target's standing to sue under
section 13(d) in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 20 9
The court did not rule on Spencer's motion for a preliminary in-
junction until Agency had made a tender offer and some shares had
been tendered. 210 Applying the federal courts' traditional standards for
granting a preliminary injunction,2  the court found that Spencer and
203. Id at 92,214. Spencer also alleged that the defendant had 1) violated Securities
Exchange Act § 10(b) and Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 and 2) commit-
ted mail and wire fraud in the acquisition of securities. Spencer contended that these al-
leged activities comprised a pattern of racketeering activity. The court disregarded these
allegations as unsupported and conclusory. Id at 92,214 n.2. Spencer did not contend that
the alleged violations of Securities Exchange Act §§ 9(a)(2), 14(d), and 14(e) constituted
racketeering activity. See id. at 92,215 n.3. In general, § 10(b) may not be a viable alterna-
tive to the Williams Act in stating a RICO claim since the provisions of § 10(b) and the
Williams Act are not completely overlapping; behavior that supports an allegation of a vio-
lation of the Williams Act may not support an allegation of a violation of § 10(b).
204. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301, at 91,894 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
205. Id
206. Id
207. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See supra notes 77-90 & accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 99-100 & accompanying text.
209. 422 U.S. 49 (1975). See Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301, at 91,894 (D. Mass. Sept. 21,
1981). See supra note 97 for a list of cases after Chris-Craft explicitly granting a target
standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 13(d).
210. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D. Mass.
1981). The tender offer was publicly announced on January 27, 1982, but the preliminary
injunction did not issue until April 29, 1982. Id at 237-38.
211. The Supreme Court held in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975),
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its shareholders would be likely to suffer irreparable harm if Agency
were permitted to gain control of Spencer through the tender offer.212
The court also found that Spencer had a reasonable likelihood of pre-
vailing on the merits on some of the issues.213 In particular, it held that
Spencer was likely to establish that Agency had violated section 13(d)
by filing materially misleading Schedules 13D that created the impres-
sion that Agency was contemplating numerous alternatives with respect
to the Spencer stock, when in fact Agency intended either to acquire
control of Spencer or to force Spencer to repurchase the shares at a
profit to Agency.214 The court also held that Spencer was likely to
prove that Agency's tender offer violated sections 14(d) and 14(e), be-
cause it did not fairly disclose Agency's purpose in seeking to take over
Spencer.2 15 Consequently, the court enjoined Agency from accepting
stock tenders made before the date on which Agency supplemented its
defective tender offer unless the tenderors were individually served
with the supplement.216 The court was not convinced, however, that
Spencer was likely to succeed on the merits of the issue of the adequacy
of Agency's tender offer as supplemented. Consequently, it refused to
enjoin preliminarily the acceptance of stock tenders made after the date
of the supplement. 217
The RICO Count
Agency's motion to dismiss the RICO count was predicated on
Spencer's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court, citing United States v. Turkette,218 noted the broad purpose
of RICO and held that RICO's sanctions were not limited to members
of organized crime.219 The court determined that a plaintiff must al-
that a showing of irreparable harm is a prerequisite to the issuance of a permanent injunc-
tion to remedy violations of the Williams Act. Id at 61. See supra text accompanying notes
73-75. This decision has led the federal courts to require such a showing before a prelimi-
nary injunction is issued. The courts have generally also have required a showing that
there is a likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the
merits. See generally E. ARANOW, supra note 65, at 129-33. The standards for granting a
preliminary injunction in cases involving tender offers and the Williams Act, however, are
not completely settled. Id.
212. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D. Mass.
1982).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
219. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981)
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lege three elements in order to state a cause of action under RICO: 1) a
pattern of racketeering activity; 2) a violation of section 1962; and 3)
injury caused by the violation. 220 Finding that Spencer had properly
alleged each element, the court denied Agency's motion.
22
'
Pattern of Racketeering Activity
One of the principal issues raised by Spencer's allegation that
Agency's intentionally misleading Schedules 13D constituted racke-
teering activity was whether a violation of section 13(d), arising in con-
nection with apurchase, is included within RICO's predicate offense of
"fraud in the sale of securities". 222 Unable to find a judicial precedent
interpreting the phrase,22 the court relied on RICO's liberal construc-
tion provision, the liberal construction given RICO's definitional sec-
tions by other courts, and the overall remedial purpose of the statute.
The court concluded that the statute "would appear to encompass
fraud committed by the purchaser of securities, as well as by the
seller." 224
220. Id.
221. Id. at 92,217.
222. Id. at 92,215.
223. Id. The court incorrectly noted that the presence of a sale of securities had not
even been alleged in Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Del.
1978), one of the few cases at the time in which a RICO claim had been predicated on
violations of the federal securities laws. Upon Agency's motion to reconsider, the court
noted that although Farmers Bank did involve a sale of securities, that fact did not alter its
prior holding that "fraud in the sale of securities" encompassed a purchase of securities. See
Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., No. 81-2097-S, slip op. (D. Mass. Dec. 7,
1981) (available June 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
224. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). It would seem that an
expansive interpretation of "fraud in the sale of securities" could have been avoided had the
court found that a fraudulent sale of securities occurred at the time Agency sold its Gateway
stock, the proceeds of which were used to purchase Spencer stock.
It has also been suggested that an interpretation of "fraud in the sale of securities" that
includes purchases can be circumvented by resorting to other RICO predicate offenses. See
Long, supra note 130, at 205 n.31; MacIntosh, supra note 144, at 12-13; Morrison, supra note
109, at 73 n.25. Spencer apparently tried such an approach by alleging that Agency had
violated the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, but the court disregarded these allegations
as unsupported and conclusory. See supra note 203; see also infra note 253 (failed even to
address allegations of mail and wire fraud as a pattern of racketeering activity). Further, use
of the mail and wire fraud statutes may not be an effective alternative to the Williams Act
even when a sale is present since good faith is a complete defense. See Blakey, supra note
124, at 244 n.23 ("no honest person need fear a civil suit under RICO based on the underly-
ing theory of mail fraud, for good faith has always been a complete defense"). Absent good
faith on the defendant's part, however, and assuming all other elements of mail or wire
fraud are present, this alternative might be feasible. See Long, supra note 130, at 205 n. 31;
MacIntosh, supra note 144, at 12-13. See also infra note 312.
One commentator argues that the Spencer court should have applied Blue Chip Stamps
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The court also held that each misleading Schedule 13D and each
amendment to the Schedule 13D could constitute an independent rack-
eteering activity, and that any two together established the requisite
pattern.225 The court then noted that a technical violation committed
without scienter is not sufficient; the violation must be a willful one
that could warrant criminal sanctions.226 Since Spencer had properly
alleged that the section 13(d) violations were intentional, the court ac-
knowledged their criminal nature under section 32(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.227
Violation of Section 1962
Spencer is a model RICO suit in that it involves properly alleged
violations of the three major subsections of section 1962. First, Spencer
claimed that Agency violated section 1962(a) by acquiring an interest
in an enterprise (Spencer) with funds derived from a pattern of racke-
teering activity. The pattern of racketeering activity alleged by Spencer
consisted of the misleading Schedules 13D Agency filed with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission in connection with its original
purchases of Gateway shares.228 The court ruled that it was not neces-
sary to trace the actual acquisition funds to the pattern of racketeering
activity and that a demonstration that the illicit income allowed or fa-
cilitated the acquisition would suffice.229 Because Spencer's complaint
indicated that Agency had acquired $4,000,000 worth of Gateway stock
in 1980 that was sold at a $2,000,000 profit in February 1981, the same
time that Agency began its open market purchases of Spencer, the court
found a supportable inference that the income derived from the sale of
shares in Gateway permitted or facilitated the purchases of Spencer
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (purchaser-seller requirement for Securities and
Exchange Commission rule lOb-5), to RICO, and if it had, Spencer would not have had a
claim under RICO since it was not a purchaser or seller. MacIntosh, supra note 144, at 33-
37. Another commentator disagrees. See Note, supra note 154, at 1116-17. The latter view
seems correct since RICO's remedies are express (unlike rule lOb-5's implied remedies) and
because a party other than a purchaser or seller of securities can be "injured in his business
or property by reason of" the violation of rule lOb-5.
225. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
226. Id. See supra notes 124-25, 132 & accompanying text.
227. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). See supra note 124.
228. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 11981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,215 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
229. Id. at 92,215-16. As authority for applying this broad test to alleged violations of
§ 1962(a), the court relied on United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 1980).
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stock.230
Second, Spencer contended that Agency had violated section
1962(b) by acquiring an interest in Spencer through a pattern of racke-
teering activity that consisted of Agency's filing of misleading Sched-
ules 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with its purchases of the Spencer stock.23' The court agreed, recogniz-
ing that the allegedly misleading statements were filed in order to per-
mit Agency to continue its systematic purchase of Spencer stock.232
Third, Spencer alleged that the individual defendants, Frankino
and Smith, had violated section 1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an
enterprise (Agency) through these two alleged patterns of racketeering
activity.233 The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the nexus
between the alleged pattern of racketeering activity and the affairs of
Agency was not sufficient. It relied on a section 1962(c) nexus test for-
mulated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: one conducts the
activities of an enterprise when 1) one is enabled to commit the predi-
cate offenses solely by reason of a position in, involvement with, or
control over the affairs of, the enterprise, or 2) there is a relationship
between the predicate offenses and the activities of the enterprise.234
Applying this test, the court determined that Frankino, as chairman of
the board of Agency, and Smith, as president of Agency, were closely
involved with and controlled the affairs of Agency, and that Agency's
business included both the rental of automobiles and investment in
other companies. 235 Thus, the court concluded that the nexus test had
been met.236
Injury
Finally, in holding that Spencer's complaint was sufficient to state
230. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361, at 92,216 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). Presumably, had Agency
not sold the Gateway shares at a profit, it would have bad no "income" (at least in the
federal income tax sense) derived from a pattern of racketeering activity with which to ac-
quire the Spencer shares, and thus the § 1962(a) allegation would have failed.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 961 (198 1)). The Scotto court established the two-prong test in the disjunctive. It is not
entirely clear whether the court in Spencer read the test of Scotto as being conjunctive or
whether the court simply determined that both prongs of the test had been satisfied See
infra text accompanying notes 235-36..
235. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361, at 92,216 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
236. Id.
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a civil RICO claim for treble damages, the court manifested its views
on the type of harm compensable under section 1964(c) and the causa-
tion required in order to recover. It did not comment on the allegation
that Spencer had been irreparably harmed, "particularly to its business
relationships with present and future suppliers, contractors, and cus-
tomers. ' 237 The allegation apparently satisfied the "injured in his busi-
ness or property" requirement of section 1964(c). 238
On the question of causation, the court seemed to adopt the nar-
row interpretation of section 1964(c) that the alleged injuries must stem
from the RICO violation itself and not merely from the underlying
predicate offenses.239 Even under this restrictive interpretation, how-
ever, the court found that Spencer's claim sufficed, since the injuries
alleged by Spencer clearly stemmed "directly from its infiltration by
the defendants through a pattern of racketeering activity." 240 Indeed, it
is apparent that the infiltration itself constituted the violations of sec-
tion 1962(a) and (b).
Despite these conclusions, the court stayed all discovery and pro-
ceedings relating to the RICO count until Spencer was able to show
that the defendants had caused it "legally compensable injury." 241 By
late 1982, Spencer had satisfied the court in this regard, and the RICO
count was reopened by court order.242 In 1983 the entire lawsuit was
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and the litigants entered into a
settlement agreement in which Agency, Frankino, and Smith repre-
sented that they had sold all their Spencer stock to an investment bank-
ing firm and agreed that they would not acquire or hold directly or
indirectly, for ten years, any Spencer stock.243 The tender offer had
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. See supra note 189. One commentator has taken issue with the restrictive "in-
filtration" requirement implicitly suggested by the Spencer court and argues that while pro-
tecting legitimate business against infiltration by organized crime is the primary purpose of
RICO, Congress did not intend to restrict RICO's scope to any specific stage or kind of
infiltration. Note, supra note 154, at 1114-15.
241. Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
242. No record of the court order was made on the docket sheet. This information was
obtained from written communications with counsel for the litigants (on file with the Has-
tings Law Journal).
243. Joint Motion For Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice and Exhibit A (Settlement
Agreement), and Order Granting Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, Spencer Companies
v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
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Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd 244
Hanna Mining Company (Hanna) is a Delaware corporation that
deals in ferrous and non-ferrous minerals and metals, in addition to
energy resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal. Its stock is listed for
trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Norcen Energy Resources
Ltd. (Norcen) is a Canadian corporation engaged in the business of
exploring, developing, and producing oil and natural gas.245
In August 1981, Norcen began to purchase Hanna stock on the
open market.246 In early November 1981, after it had acquired almost
nine percent of the Hanna stock, Norcen filed a timely Schedule
13D.247 Five months later, Norcen announced its intention to com-
mence a tender offer that would give it a controlling interest in
Hanna.248 Within an hour, Hanna brought suit against Norcen,249 two
members of its board, and its president, to enjoin the proposed tender
offer.250 The injunction was requested on the grounds that the defend-
ants' conduct in connection with the acquistion of, and proposed tender
offer for, Hanna stock violated sections 13(d) and 14(e) of the Williams
Act. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants had filed a
materially false, misleading, and deceptive Schedule 13D with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, willfully failed to disclose material
facts subsequent to filing the Schedule 13D, and intentionally manipu-
lated the trading market in Hanna's stock.251
244. There are two reported decisions in the Hanna litigation. The discussion of the
Williams Act count is at [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878 (N.D.
Ohio June 11, 1982). The RICO count is discussed at [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
245. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,878, at 94,570-71 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
246. Id. at 94,574.
247. Id. at 94,576.
248. Id. at 94,582.
249. Id. at 94,570-7 1. Norcen's investment banker was originally named as a defendant,
but claims against it were subsequently dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Id. at
94,570.
250. Id. Hanna obtained a temporary restraining order almost immediately thereafter,
and that order was extended by stipulation until a decision was reached on the preliminary
injunction. Hanna also sought a permanent injunction and the remedy of divestiture. Plain-
tiffs Complaint at 24, Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
251. Id. at 14. Hanna also sought injunctive relief based on allegations that the defend-
ants had committed, inter alia, acts in violation of the Ohio takeover statute, § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, and Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. Hanna Min-
ing Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
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Hanna then filed an amended complaint alleging that the defend-
ants had violated section 1962(b) of RICO since their acquisition and
maintenance of an interest in Hanna intentionally violated Williams
Act sections 13(d) and 14(e)252 and constituted a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.253 For the alleged RICO violation, Hanna sought damages
and injunctive relief.
The Williams Act Counts
At the outset the court determined that Hanna had standing to
seek injunctive relief. The court's analysis of standing under section
13(d) was virtually identical to the approach used by the Spencer court.
The court accepted standing under section 14(e) without question.2 54
In the court's view the evidence conclusively established that Norcen
had falsely stated in its Schedule 13D that it had acquired its nine per-
cent holding in Hanna for investment purposes when in fact it was con-
98,878, at 94,570 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). With respect to the claim under the takeover
statute, the court, in an unreported separate opinion, held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., No. C82-959 (N.D. Ohio June
11, 1982) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). For a brief discussion of the court's deter-
mination of the § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims, see infra note 259.
252. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,733 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). The complaint also
added one of Norcen's vice-presidents as a defendant. When violations of§ 14(e) have been
alleged but no target stock has been acquired, a RICO plaintiff would have difficulty using
§ 1962(b) since there has been no acquisition of an enterprise. Furthermore, if the § 14(e)
violations did not involve a "sale," they would not constitute the predicate offense of "fraud
in the sale of securities" and no pattern of racketeering activity could derive from these
violations. In such a case, a RICO plaintiff would not be able to use the § 14(e) violations to
state a claim under § 1962(c) either, since an allegation that the affairs of the offeror were
being conducted by the officers through a pattern of racketeering activity would not be via-
ble. See su.pra note 130.
253. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,733 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). The amended com-
plaint, fied seven days after the original complaint, also alleged, inter alia, that the defend-
ants had violated the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and that the violation of these
statutes constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts Four and Five of the Supplemental
and Amended Complaint at 12-13, Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). The
court did not mention this allegation in its opinion. In addition, the amended complaint
alleged that defendants' conduct violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976. Id at 19-20. The defendants' motion to dismiss this count was granted on the
grounds that the statute did not create a private right of action in favor of anyone. Hanna
Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,742, at 93,733, 93,740 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
254. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 98,878, at 94,584-88 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
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templating a takeover.2 5 Norcen was unable to persuade the court that
the decision to launch the tender offer was formulated on the evening
before the offer was announced. Indeed, the court noted that a raider's
"final decision" and its "intent" were distinguishable.256 In addition,
Norcen's issuance of two curative public documents, a press release
and an amendment to its Schedule 13D disclosing its intention to make
the tender offer, did not eliminate the possibility of irreparable harm.
Instead, the court reasoned that: 1) by reason of its nine percent interest
in Hanna, Norcen had an advantage over any competing bidders; 2) if
its tender offer were successful, Norcen would have no incentive to pay
a premium to the remaining Hanna shareholders should Hanna and
Norcen subsequently merge; and 3) the Hanna shareholders who sold
shares to Norcen before the corrective disclosures irretrievably lost the
opportunity to obtain a control premium.257 The court concluded that
Hanna, with respect to its section 13(d) claims, had shown a substantial
probability of success on the merits and had demonstrated that it could
suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the court held that under section 13(d) Hanna was enti-
tled to the requested relief.258
The court also held that under section 14(e) Hanna was entitled to
a preliminary injunction against Norcen's misleading statements, ongo-
ing deception about its intent to gain control of Hanna, and market
manipulation of Hanna stock.259 Although this conduct preceded the
255. Noreen had filed an amendment to its original Schedule 13D shortly after it an-
nounced its intent to make a tender offer. Id. at 94,583. The court found that the evidence
raised serious questions about the veracity of the disclosures contained in the amendment.
Id. at 94,589.
256. Id. at 94,589. The court's distinction between Norcen's final decision to make the
tender offer and its intent to do so was based on the holding of Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbrit-
ton, 516 F. Supp. 164, 175 (D.D.C. 1981).
257. Hanna Mining Co. v. Noreen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878, at 94,591 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
258. Id. at 94,589, 94,591.
259. Id. at 94,594. The court also held that Hanna was entitled to a preliminary injuc-
tion under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange Commission
rule lOb-5, although it noted an awareness of a line of cases holding that a target corporation
does not have standing because it is not a purchaser or seller of securities. Id.
With respect to Norcen's misleading statements, the court indicated that a violation of
§ 13(d) can also be a violation of § 14(e) as long as the statements that violate § 13(d) are
made "in connection with a tender offer," as required by § 14(e). Id. at 94,592-94. Accord-
ing to Hanna's complaint, however, the misleading statements were not only contained in
Norcen's Schedule 13D but also in Norcen's 1981 Form 10-K and Norcen's annual report to
the shareholders. See id. at 94,592.
The gravamen of Hanna's manipulation allegation was that Norcen's failure to disclose
its true intention in acquiring Hanna's stock enabled Norcen to maintain the price of
Hanna's stock at an artificially low trading level. This conduct allegedly allowed Norcen to
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announcement of the tender offer, the court concluded that it was nev-
ertheless "in connection with a tender offer" as contemplated by section
14(e). 260 The court further concluded that Norcen's acts of "simple
nondisclosure" constituted a manipulative scheme in violation of sec-
tion 14(e) and that the proper remedy was not merely the elimination
of the manipulation through corrective disck ;ure, but the termination
of the offer.26' Accordingly, Hanna's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion preventing Norcen from carrying out its proposed tender offer was
granted under section 14(e) as well as under section 13(d).262 Further-
more, the court indicated that although the formulation of the appro-
priate remedy would have to await a final hearing on a permanent
injunction, Hanna's evidence supported the requested remedy of
divestiture. 263
The RICO Claim
Norcen moved to dismiss Hanna's section 1962(b) claims on the
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.264 In support of its motion, Norcen asserted that: 1) RICO did
not create a cause of action for violations of the federal securities laws;
2) fraud in connection with the purchase of securities was not one of
RICO's predicate offenses and; 3) the requisite nexus between Hanna
(the enterprise) and a pattern of racketeering activity did not exist.265
1) mislead Hanna stockholders and the investing public into thinking that the proposed
tender offer price represented a substantial premium over the market price, 2) acquire fur-
ther substantial holdings in Hanna at a price below the true value, and 3) insulate itself from
competing bidders for Hanna stock. Plaintiff's Supplemental and Amended Complaint at
14, Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
260. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878, at 94,592-94 (N.D. Ohio June II, 1982). The defendants
argued that since Noren made no misleading statements after the public announcement of
the tender offer, the court erroneously relied upon cases holding that statements made by
either the offeror or target company prior to the actual effective date of a tender offer but
after the announcement of the offer fall within the purview of § 14(e). Id. at 94,593. The
court found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the court noted that there
were serious questions as to the truthfulness of the disclosures in Norcen's amended Sched-
ule 13D, which was filed after the announcement. Second, the court believed that, even had
all the misleading disclosures in fact been made before the announcement of the tender
offer, the defendants' proposed construction of the phrase "in connection with a tender of-
fer" was overly restrictive. Id. at 94,593-94.
261. Id. at 94,594-96.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 94,596.
264. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,733 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
265. Id. at 93,733-34.
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The court found that each of Norcen's three contentions was without
merit and denied the motion to dismiss.266
Addressing Norcen's first contention, the court observed that
RICO encompasses on its face violations of the federal securities
laws.267 The court chose to rely on the views of one commentator
268
and on the broad reading given RICO by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Turkette269 rather than adopt the approach of those courts that
had restricted private rights of action under RICO.2 70 Specifically, the
court held that in order to state a cause of action under section 1964(c),
it is unnecessary to prove or even allege "competitive injury" or "racke-
teering injury" or that the defendant is affiliated with organized
crime.271 The court also declined to follow any infiltration standing
requirement that the Spencer court may have imposed.272 Rather, the
court stated that it would authorize private rights of action for viola-
tions of the RICO predicate offenses even if the plaintiff was not the
direct victim of the activities prohibited under section 1962.273
The court summarily disposed of Norcen's second contention and
held that even though Norcen was the purchaser and not the seller, its
conduct still fell within the scope of the phrase "fraud in the sale of
securities. ' 274
Norcen's third contention appeared to be that since its purchases
of Hanna stock, which brought its holdings close to the five-percent
mark, were made before filing the allegedly fraudulent Schedule 13D,
it had not acquired or maintained an interest in Hanna "through" a
pattern of racketeering activity.275 The court found Norcen's construc-
tion of the term "through" unduly restrictive, and instead used the Sec-
266. Id. at 93,739.
267. Id. at 93,738.
268. Major portions of this section of the court's opinion quoted or paraphrased Note,
supra note 154.
269. 452 U.S. 567 (1981).
270. See supra notes 185-90 & accompanying text.
271. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,739 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
272. Id. at 98,738. See supra note 240 & accompanying text.
273. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,738 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). The court's statement in
this regard was not necessary, however, since Hanna was certainly "infiltrated," in the Spen-
cer sense, by Norcen and was a direct victim of the § 1962(b) activity. Cf. Note, supra note
154, at 1119-20 (would allow private rights of action for victims of the RICO predicate
offenses in § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) situations but not in § 1962(a) situations).
274. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742, at 93,738 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982)
275. Id.
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ond Circuit's nexus test, namely, that one conducts the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when "the predi-
cate offenses are related to the activities of [the] enterprise." 276 The
court concluded that the alleged Williams Act violations committed by
Norcen in acquiring and maintaining the Hanna stock related to
Hanna's internal affairs and held that the requisite nexus was clearly
established. 277
In order to give the parties time to conduct adequate discovery, the
court reserved further ruling on the RICO claim. Norcen, however,
requested an expedited appeal on the preliminary injunction that was
issued to redress the alleged Williams Act violations.278 After both par-
ties had prepared briefs, the case was settled.279 By the terms of the
settlement agreement, Hanna agreed to issue and sell to Norcen, and
Norcen agreed to purchase, the number of shares of Hanna's common
stock that would bring Norcen's investment in Hanna to an aggregate
of twenty percent of the total outstanding shares of Hanna common
stock. Norcen agreed to view its holdings in Hanna as an investment.
It also promised that neither the company nor its officers would acquire
directly or indirectly any additional Hanna stock.280 Even though
Norcen was able to obtain a substantial holding in Hanna by the agree-
ment, the tender offer had failed.
276. Id. at 95,739. See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981). See also supra note 234 & accompanying text.
277. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,742, at 93,739 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982). While the court's hold-
ing seems correct, its analysis may be faulty. The Scotto court's nexus test establishes how
one conducts the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and thus
should be applicable only to a § 1962(c) violation. A § 1962(b) violation, which was at issue
in Hanna, involves acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. The word through should connote a different type of nexus for each
situation. The court's statement that Norcen's fraud in acquiring and maintaining its Hanna
stock (language reflecting a § 1962(b) violation) related to Hanna's internal affairs (language
reflecting a § 1962(c) violation) seems confused. The court could have found that Norcen
acquired, or at least maintained, an interest in Hanna by reason of both the ongoing decep-
tion and market manipulations, violative of§ 14(e), and the § 13(d) violations, thereby obvi-
ating the misplaced reliance on the Scotto nexus test.
278. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-3386 (6th
Cir. June 28, 1982), dismissed per stipulation.
279. Settlement Agreement, Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); [1982 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
280. Neither Norcen nor its officers were bound by the covenant not to acquire addi-
tional Hanna shares unless Hanna increased the number of directors to 16 and caused three
Norcen representatives to be elected to the board.
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The Conflict Between RICO and the Williams Act
The courts' interpretation of the Williams Act and RICO in Spen-
cer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. 281 and Hanna Mining Co. v.
Noreen Energy Resources Ltd 282 may appear anticlimactic in light of
our previous discussion of these two statutes. The courts' approval of
claims by targets for equitable relief under the Williams Act is in ac-
cord with numerous lower federal court decisions rendered after Chris-
Craft and should not be surprising.283 Further, both Spencer and
Hanna support our interpretation of RICO by acknowledging that
RICO claims can be based on intentional violations of the Williams
Act and that there is no organized crime requirement. In light of the
express language of RICO that grants RICO victims a new weapon,
and RICO's history that evinces a congressional policy to extend
RICO's reach to white collar commercial crime, the disposition of the
RICO claims in Spencer and Hanna appears sound.
Yet the RICO actions in Spencer and Hanna are not simply RICO
cases. They are Williams Act-RICO cases and must therefore be evalu-
ated in light of the history and purposes of the Williams Act as well.
Viewed in this way, the RICO claims in Spencer and Hanna should
have failed. It is our contention that while the congressional goals be-
hind RICO countenance this type of Williams Act-based RICO suit,
such suits undermine the Williams Act's policy of statutory and regula-
tory neutrality in takeover attempts. In short, RICO sanctions such
suits but the Williams Act does not. Spencer and Hanna present classic
examples of litigation based on two statutes with irreconcilable policy
goals. In such cases, familiar judicial doctrines mandate that one stat-
ute yield to the other.284 In the present context, RICO suits predicated
on Williams Act violations should yield to the policies of the Williams
Act.
RICO Suits Based on the Williams Act Undermine the
Williams Act
The Williams Act's policy of neutrality was designed to apply to
281. 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981); [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,301 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
282. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,878 (N.D. Ohio June 11,
1982); [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
283. See supra note 97 & accompanying text.
284. See infra note 309 & accompanying text.
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the takeover contest in the courtroom as well as in the field. 28 5 When
the battle for corporate control shifts to the courtroom, to permit a tar-
get company to maintain a RICO suit based on Williams Act violations
is to provide target management with a defensive weapon that we be-
lieve would not have been condoned by the Williams Act Congress.
Such suits enlarge the permissible activities of targets seeking to thwart
tender offers286 and upset the sensitive balance that Congress estab-
lished when it passed the Williams Act. The threat of massive damage
suits may deter the making of some tender offers, which was a concern
of the Supreme Court in Chris-Craft.287 Suits for equitable relief may
indefinitely delay a takeover, a concern of the Supreme Court in
MITE.288
Furthermore, when the offeror violates the Williams Act, the tar-
get will almost invariably be able to redress the violation through a
RICO suit because the requisite sale (or purchase) of securities will
necessarily be present.289 Yet when the target transgresses the strictures
of the Williams Act, RICO will not always be available to the offeror
since there is a broad range of target conduct that violates the Williams
Act but that does not involve a sale or purchase of securities.
To illustrate this disparity, we start with the assumption that a
Williams Act-based RICO suit brought by a tender offeror would al-
lege that target management, on behalf of the target, acquired an inter-
est in the target290 or conducted the affairs of the target291 through a
pattern of Williams Act violations that involved sales or purchases of
securities. Such a suit would be viable if based on an allegation that
the target company's sale or issuance of its shares to persons friendly to
management, a "white knight," or competitor of the offeror (so as to
create antitrust problems for the offeror) constituted a manipulative
practice within the meaning of the second clause of section 14(e). A
suit would also be viable if it alleged that the sale or issuance was
cloaked in false or misleading statements in violation of the first clause
285. Judicial criticism of the state takeover statutes, for example, has for the most part
focused on the concern that these statutes frustrate the Williams Act's policy of neutrality in
the field. See supra notes 101-03 & accompanying text.
286. See supra note 50 & accompanying text.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
288. See supra notes 103-04. See also Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc.,
568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), which states, in discussing MITE, that "any restriction
the Supreme Court imposes through the supremacy clause upon a State in regulating tender
offers should apply to similar interference by private persons." Id. at 1541.
289. See supra note 130.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
291. Id § 1962 (c).
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of section 14(e), or that the target company's repurchase of its own
shares violated section 13(e) of the Williams Act and Securities and
Exchange Commission rule 13e-1. 292
When a target violates the false or misleading statement clause of
section 14(e) in other circumstances, however, the tender offeror may
be hard pressed to point to a fraud in the sale or purchase of securities.
For example, if the target makes false statements about the tender of-
feror in an attempt to persuade the target shareholders that the take-
over would be detrimental to them or that they should not tender their
shares, the shareholders may be convinced and the offeror may do ex-
actly what the target wanted-withdraw the offer. In such a case, there
is no sale or purchase. Even if some shareholders do tender their
shares but the tender offer is ultimately defeated because of the target's
false statements, it is the non-tendering (not the tendering) sharehold-
ers who have relied on the false statements. In this situation it would
strain the statutory language to conclude that there has been "fraud in
the sale of securities." Similarly, certain defensive tactics that may con-
stitute section 14(e) manipulative practices, such as lock-up arrange-
ments providing options to other corporations to purchase the target's
stock or its "crown jewel" (the most prized assset of the corporation), a
"scorched earth" defense (selling the corporation's assets or destroying
the character of the corporation), or "shark repellents" (amendments of
the articles or bylaws that discourage tender offers), will not usually
involve a sale or purchase of securities.
Even if a target sells or issues its stock to an outsider to thwart a
certain offeror and this sale is deemed manipulative within the mean-
ing of section 14(e), the sale may not support a RICO fraud claim if no
deception was involved.293 Furthermore, it has been argued that out-
right sales to "white knights" are less manipulative than other types of
lock-up arrangements and may not even constitute a violation of sec-
tion 14(e).294 Moreover, when "fraud in the sale of securities" can be
properly alleged in offeror RICO suits, a court may permit the suit to
be brought only against the corporation itself. In such an event the
RICO suit would lose some of its sting, particularly when the suit is one
for damages.295
292. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-1 (1983). Rule 13e-1 requires that whenever a tender offer has
been announced, a target may not repurchase any of its shares unless a truthful and accurate
disclosure statement is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
293. See supra note 135.
294. Weiss, supra note 135, at 1126.
295. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983), in which the court upheld the dismissal of a § 1962(c) RICO
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In sum, because RICO suits redressing Williams Act violations are
powerful weapons more readily available to the target corporation than
to the offeror, they are antithetical to the principle of evenhanded pro-
tection to all participants in the tender offer process as contemplated by
Congress when it passed the Williams Act.
Although neither the Spencer nor Hanna courts dismissed the tar-
get's Williams Act suit for equitable relief,296 the addition of the RICO
count still gave the targets a significant weapon. First, the courts have
never allowed target damage suits brought under section 13(d), 297 and
after Chris-Craft no target has been accorded standing to sue for dam-
ages under section 14(d) or (e).2 98 Second, the RICO suit for treble
damages and attorneys' fees is a powerful defense: the smear tactics
value of a racketeer charge299 coupled with the threat of protracted and
expensive litigation3O probably affected the outcome of the litigation
settlements in Spencer and Hanna and contributed to the ultimate fail-
ure of the tender offers.
The Spencer and Hanna decisions, however, do not typify the sce-
nario of tender offer litigation in which a Williams Act-RICO suit
would exert its pure and singular potency. When the courts in Spencer
and Hanna granted the targets standing to seek equitable relief under
the Williams Act, the RICO claim merely enhanced incumbent man-
agement's ability to defeat the tender offer. Yet had the courts denied
suit against a corporation on the ground that the corporation could not be both a "person"
and the "enterprise" under RICO. Id. at 1190. Under this view, a target could not acquire
an interest in itself (§ 1962(b)), or conduct its own affairs (§ 1962(c)). But see United States
v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983), in which the
court decided that a corporation could be convicted on a RICO count even though the cor-
poration was the "enterprise" and the corporation's shareholders, directors, and most of the
officers were not indicted or convicted along with the corporation. Id. at 988.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 209, 254.
297. See supra note 96 & accompanying text.
298. See supra note 92 & accompanying text.
299. At the time the RICO complaint was filed in Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278
(4th Cir. 1983), Carl Icahn, the alleged racketeer, stated: "I consider it an abomination that
a company's management should resort to these gutter and smear tactics. These allegations
are completely unfounded and are simply designed to dissuade me from continuing my
interest in the company." See Marcus, Racketeering Law Increasingiy Involved to Thwart
Takeovers, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1983 (Wash. Bus.), at 1, 16, col. 4.
300. A RICO damage suit may have a longer life than a Williams Act suit for equitable
relief. A target seeking damages with a Williams Act-based RICO suit need only allege, not
prove, violations of the Williams Act to proceed with the litigation. For example, Spencer
and Hanna did not have to prove violations of the Williams Act to withstand their defend-
ants' motions to dismiss. On the other hand, a target seeking an injunction under the Wil-
liams Act would have to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits to proceed
with the litigation. See supra note 211 & accompanying text.
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standing under the Williams Act,30 the RICO damage suit might have
survived as the targets' only litigation weapon. 30 2 Further, under our
interpretation of the RICO statute, Spencer and Hanna also would
have been permitted to maintain an express equitable RICO action.30 3
Since the gravamen of the complaint in a Williams Act-RICO lawsuit
for equitable relief would be the prohibited acquisition, rather than the
individual Williams Act violations, the remedy sought would have ac-
complished forthrightly what Spencer and Hanna management
wanted: divestiture of the acquired shares and an injunction prohibit-
ing future acquisitions. 30 4 Moreover, had Spencer and Hanna sought
equitable relief under RICO, they might not have been required to es-
tablish irreparable injury,305 which is required in most equitable ac-
tions instituted under the Williams Act306 after the Supreme Court's
decision in Rondeau. 3 07 Thus, had Spencer and Hanna been denied
standing to sue for equitable relief under the Williams Act, their bur-
den in proceeding under RICO would have been lighter.
It can hardly be questioned that the policies of the Williams Act
and RICO give rise to a fundamental conflfict.308 By giving target man-
agement a powerful weapon in the takeover battle, the judicial ap-
301. See supra note 99 & accompanying text.
302. If standing to sue under the Williams Act had been denied in Spencer, the RICO
suit essentially would have permitted Spencer to avoid the standing problem by the simple
expedient of putting a different label on the pleading. See supra note 99. Hanna could have
also used the preliminary injunction issued under Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission rule lob-5 as a weapon. But a target's standing under
§ 10(b) is questionable, see supra note 259, and § 10(b) may not always support a viable
claim for a target in takeover attempts, see supra note 203.
In sum, because a target's standing to seek an injunction is not assured under the Wil-
liams Act, § 10(b), or antitrust legislation, see supra note 253, and because of the judicial
trend holding state takeover statutes unconstitutional, see W. PAINTER, supra note 96,
§ 10.09, at 81 (Supp. 1982), reliance on target RICO suits as a defensive litigation tactic in
takeover attempts seems unavoidable.
303. See supra notes 141-45 & accompanying text. Such an action would have been
permissible regardless of the holding on the standing issue under the Williams Act but, of
course, would have taken on more significance if standing had been denied.
304. If a court adopts the view that a RICO claim is cognizable when the plaintiff has
suffered injury only from a violation of § 1961 (and not § 1962), equitable remedies could
issue solely for the Williams Act violation itself, if feasible. See supra notes 186-91 & ac-
companying text.
305. Trane v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, [Current
Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) % 99,502 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (dictum). See also
Blakey, supra note 124, at 338 n.217 (when a federal statute authorizes an injunction, neither
inadequacy of the remedy at law nor irreparable injury need be shown, whether the govern-
ment or a private party is seeking the injunction).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
307. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
308. Although RICO's remedial purposes could be said to further in some ways the
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proval of RICO suits predicated on Williams Act violations
undermines the careful policy of evenhandedness that the Williams Act
Congress sought so hard to attain. In addition, if the Supreme Court
resolves some of the standing questions left open by Chris-Craft by de-
nying targets standing to sue for damages and equitable relief under
the Williams Act, the use of RICO in tender offer litigation will further
tip the balance in favor of target companies.
The Williams Act Policy of Neutrality Should Apply to the
Exclusion of RICO's Policies
Although the conflict of federal policies created in the Spencer and
Hanna litigation was neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the
courts, the Supreme Court has previously resolved similar conflicts. In
doing so, it has followed a well-established principle of statutory con-
struction. This principle provides that when there are two statutes, one
dealing with the subject matter in general terms, and the other dealing
with the same subject in more detail, the two should be harmonized if
possible. If there is an unavoidable conflict, however, the specific stat-
ute will control, regardless of the priority of enactment, unless it ap-
pears that Congress intended to make the general act controlling.
30 9
An application of this familiar doctrine to the Spencer and Hanna cases
is simple. Both RICO and the Williams Act embrace the same subject
matter: the takeover process and intentional violations of the statutes
regulating that process. The Williams Act, focusing exclusively on the
takeover process, deals with the subject in a precise and specific man-
ner. It imposes a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the takeover
process and arguably provides a target with implied remedies for viola-
tions of this regulatory scheme. On the other hand, RICO covers a
Williams Act's purpose of investor protection, they directly conflict with the Williams Act's
purpose of neutrality.
309. Supreme Court cases applying this principle include Block v. North Dakota ex.rel.
Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 103 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1983) (the Quiet Title Act of 1972
provides the exclusive means by which adverse claimants can challenge the United States'
title to real property); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (policy of
venue provision of the National Bank Act prevails over the policy of the venue provision of
the Securities Exchange Act in a suit against a national banking association charged with
violating the Securities Exchange Act); Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834-
35 (1976) (the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of discrimi-
nation in federal employment, and a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts more gen-
eral remedies); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (state prisoners must
proceed under the specific federal habeas corpus statute and may not bring suit under the
broad language of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, even though it seems literally to
apply).
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spectrum of problems. As a result, it necessarily deals with the take-
over process in a more generalized way.310 Only a small part of
RICO's program provides a target with an express remedy for viola-
tions of the Williams Act. The Williams Act is manifestly the special
act and RICO the general one. Since the two statutes are irreconcilable
and cannot be reasonably interpreted in a manner that effectuates the
policies of both, we conclude that, absent any evidence in RICO's ex-
press language or legislative history that Congress intended RICO to
control,31' the Williams Act must prevail over RICO. The Williams
Act's policy of neutrality should nullify, in the Spencer and Hanna
cases and in similar tender offer litigation, all RICO counts based on
alleged Williams Act violations that occurred in connection with the
takeover attempts at issue.312
Such an application of this established rule of statutory construc-
tion would be far more salubrious than the likely alternative: judicial
reformulation of legislative policy in order to circumvent the breadth of
RICO's remedies when the statute leads to an undesired result.313 The
most straightforward solution, of course, would be for Congress to
amend RICO to clarify which-and under what circumstances-viola-
tions of the federal securities laws constitute a RICO predicate offense.
310. Section 1962(a) and (b), although covering a range of corporate acquisitions, in-
cluding takeovers regulated by the Williams Act, do not focus on the takeover process in any
particular way.
311. Congress only provided: "Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of
Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addi-
tion to those provided for in this title." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
312. Our recommendation is a limited one. RICO suits based on other racketeering
activities (such as mail or wire fraud) and, of course, suits deriving from the remedial aspects
of regulatory statutes other than the Williams Act (such as Securities and Exchange Com-
mission rule 10b-5) should still be viable. The Williams Act and its policy of neutrality
should never preempt the remedies of other statutes when violations of its terms have not
even been alleged; in such cases the Act does not embrace the subject matter of the litigation,
and its policy of neutrality is not brought to the fore.
One query remains. Should RICO suits based on Williams Act violations not commit-
ted during the takeover at issue (such as the claims in Spencer based on § 1962(a) and (c)
that were based on Williams Act violations that had occurred in the Gateway rather than the
Spencer takeover attempt, see supra text accompanying notes 228, 233), b- allowed to stand?
In our view, they should. Congress created remedial neutrality for each takeover attempt,
but it is unlikely that this neutrality was meant to be "transferable" from one takeover to
another. It can be argued, of course, that under a strict notion of neutrality such suits should
founder.
313. See supra notes 181-82.
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Conclusion
Congress took great care when it adopted the Williams Act to
avoid tipping the scales in favor of either side of the takeover contest.
The concept of neutrality permeates the statute. There is no evidence
suggesting that Congress, when it passed RICO two years later, had
abandoned this policy. The drafters of the RICO statute were appar-
ently unaware of the effect RICO's literal terms would have on the
takeover process and of the inconsistency they had engendered. Had
Congress been mindful of the Williams Act and its policy of neutrality
when it enacted RICO, it could have attempted to dovetail the two
statutes as it has subsequently done with the Williams Act and antitrust
legislation.314 The courts now have no choice but to rectify this con-
gressional oversight by precluding a use of violations of the statute that
create a neutrality when the use destroys that neutrality. A failure to
do so will result in a general statute emasculating a carefully crafted
regulatory scheme of a more specific statute.
This conclusion calls for only a small bite into the breadth of
RICO's application. RICO supporters who are unsettled by even the
suggestion of a "small bite" should reevaluate their concern in light of
the following considerations. First, although it is true that the RICO
Congress cast a wide net that would catch the white collar "criminal"
so as to avoid missing the organized one, RICO's predicate offense of
"fraud in the sale of securities" has been used to date in civil cases to
catch white collar criminals rather than organized ones. Second, civil
RICO fraud suits have in practice served as litigation weapons and not
as vehicles for the recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees. Not
one civil RICO securities fraud plaintiff appears to have recovered a
judgment.315 Finally, organized criminals are unlikely to acquire a
business in a manner that would trigger the disclosure requirements of
the Williams Act. In short, our recommendation could only eviscerate
congressional objectives in small measure; in the absence of this small
bite, the RICO statute could devour a major purpose of the Williams
Act.
314. See Axinn, Fogg & Stoll, Contests for Corporate Control Under the New Law of
Preacquisition Notofication, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857, 858-60 (1979) (Congress was careful
to coordinate the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 with the regula-
tory aspects of the Williams Act so that takeover attempts would not be thwarted by the
operation of the antitrust legislation's preacquisition waiting period).
315. See supra note 184 (listing cases, some of which found viable RICO securities fraud
claims).
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